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CURRENT ISSUES OF PEACE AND SECURITY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

After the end of World War II and the formation of the United Nations (UN), the international community was determined to exclude war from the arsenal of international politics. That is why one of the four goals of the UN (Article 1 of the UN Charter) is to maintain international peace and security take effective collective action to prevent and eliminate threats to peace and suppress acts of aggression or other violations of peace (*United Nations Charter*).

To achieve this goal, UN member states are obliged to adhere to the basic principles set out in Article 2 of the UN Charter, in particular: to resolve international disputes by peaceful means and in such a way as not to endanger international peace, security and justice, to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state as otherwise incompatible with the purposes of the UN (*United Nations Charter*). However, the UN era system of collective security has vividly been shown to be inadequate on several fronts (Green et al., 2022: 28).

This article examines the issue of violation of the principle of territorial integrity (integrity) or political independence of states from 1946 to 2022. The approach is based on the study and understanding of domestic and foreign literary sources, statistics, legal acts. So, the historic, comparative, formal juridical and prognostic methods will be used.

In our opinion, there are few cases of aggression with the subsequent annexation of the territory (or part of the territory) of another state after the end of World War II. In particular, Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1980, the Golan Heights in 1981, and Kuwait in Iraq from 1990-to 1991.

However, only after the temporary occupation and Russia's attempt to annex part of Ukraine – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the temporary occupation of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and especially after the Russian armed invasion on 24 February 2022, the international community started talking about the first violation of the fundamental UN principles, namely the principles of “territorial integrity” and “inviolability of borders.”

In our opinion, this is because the above facts of annexation were regional in nature and did not significantly threaten the world order, and in each case involved the mechanisms provided by the UN Charter.

Thus, the non-recognition by the international community of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights was enshrined in the relevant UN Security Council (UN SC) resolutions (*Resolution 242*, 1967; *Resolution 265*, 1980; *Resolution 297*, 1981).

It should also be noted that, unlike Russian's aggression against Ukraine (Petrenchenko, Kuryliuk, Yuryk, 2021), these cases of aggression and annexation were not accompanied by the aggressor country's most serious crimes under international law: genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENSUS IN DECISION-MAKING BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS ABUSE BY RUSSIA

According to the Charter, it is the UN SC that has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and all UN member states are obliged to comply with its decisions. Only this institution has the authority to approve the use of military force against the aggressor state (*United Nations Charter*).

The UN Charter of 26 May 1945 was developed after the end of World War II under the influence of the geopolitical division of the world. It contains a mechanism to block decisions by any permanent member of the UN SC by voting against the majority position. That is, the vote of a permanent member of the Council against the decision in question is, in essence, a veto even if he is a party to the dispute.

However, the permanent members of the UN SC have repeatedly failed to adopt a common position, which has a negative impact on strengthening international peace and security. In particular, the USSR and Russia voted against in 49% of cases, the US – 29%, Britain – 10%, China – 6%, and France – 6%. The conflict in Syria has been going on since 2011 when Russia (according to the agreement with Syria) has deployed its military aviation group (*The State*, 2016). According to the UN, all parties to the conflict are guilty of serious crimes (murder, torture, rape). In 2012 alone, Russia vetoed the Assad regime three times (Shekinsky, 2016). Even the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime did not end its support for Russia. Due to the impossibility of reaching a consensus in the UN SC, other states were forced to form an international coalition without Russian participation (Vendik, 2018) to conduct military operations to counter terrorist groups.

One of the few examples of overcoming the veto is UN General Assembly Resolution 377A (V) of 03 November 1950. However, it is not mandatory (*What*, 2022).

With the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine, like other independent states in the post-Soviet space, did not take measures to amend paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the UN Charter. This allowed Russia to promote its geopolitical ambitions in the international arena on behalf of the Soviet Union, which had ceased to exist. Other members of the UN SC have not initiated measures to bring Article 23 of the UN Charter to new geopolitical realities. There is currently no documentary evidence of Russia's election as a member of the United Nations.

For a long time, there were no objections to Russia's vote on the UN SC. This contributed to the gradual development of its aggression, and the search for ways to block the measures of influence provided for in Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter (interruption of economic ties, transport, force, etc.) against it. According to Article 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (*Vienna*, 1969), it is now extremely difficult to challenge her succession as a permanent member of the UN SC, as the international community has long recognised.

There is currently no mechanism for terminating the membership of one of the permanent members of the UN SC for systematic violations of the UN Charter (Article 2, paragraph 2) (*United Nations Charter*). In addition, a consensus in the Security Council is needed to amend the United Nations Charter (Article 108).

RUSSIA IN TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT

Among the four unsettled conflicts in the wider Black Sea region the Transnistrian one is often described as the most solvable, according to some Romanian researchers (Secieru, 2011: 241). Russia was one of the first to provoke the Transnistrian conflict (1990–1992). To resolve it, in 1992 an Agreement between Moldova and Russian with the participation of Moldovan, Russian and Transnistrian representatives established a Control Commission to resolve the situation. It provided for the neutrality of the Russian army's 14 units stationed in Transnistria, and for further negotiations on the timing of their withdrawal (*Agreement*, 1992).

The ruling of the Constitutional Court of Moldova stated that after the signing of the Moscow Agreement on 21 July 1992, peacekeeping forces of five Russian, three Moldovan and two Transnistrian battalions under the General Military Command of the OSCE Joint Control Commission (*Judgment*, 2017).

Russia has signed but not ratified an agreement on the procedure and timing of the withdrawal of its non-peacekeeping troops from Transnistria. The OSCE's special fund has not been used for this purpose. The agreement enshrined the neutrality of the 14th Russian Army, which was constantly violated by the transfer of military property, ammunition and training of militants to the Transnistrian separatists. The actions of the separatists were coordinated with the Ministry of Defence of Russia. In addition to the 1,200–1,500 Russian soldiers stationed in Transnistria, Moscow can also de facto rely on the 10,000–15,000 active-duty troops (Author's estimate based on Moldovan government data), including interior and border guard forces, which are controlled by the local pro-Russian Transnistrian authorities – who are themselves directly supported and financed by Russia (Minzarari, 2014).

By Resolution No 1334 of November 17, 1995, Russia recognized Transnistria as a “zone of special strategic interest.” Russia's de facto “jurisdiction” over Transnistria has been mentioned in several ECtHR rulings. Without Russia's military, economic and political support, the separatist regime could not have survived (*Judgment*, 2017). Transnistrian was created and exists thanks to the support of the Russian Federation. In a recent interview, Russian Deputy Prime Minister D. Rogozin told the Russia “24 news” channel that “basically all members of the Transnistrian government are

citizens of Russian.” He went on to say that close to 200,000 inhabitants of the secessionist region (roughly one third of its total population) are Russian citizens, and even though the rest are not formally so, they feel Russian in spirit.

Consequently, Russia has long ago achieved both political and military control over Transnistria. The only thing missing is formal recognition and annexation. However, de facto Russia had already done both things, exploiting and misusing its guarantor status in the negotiations process. And as Rogozin revealed, the region is run by Russian citizens. Furthermore, since December 2013, the Transnistrian authorities have begun implementing Russian legislation – or at least declared their intention to do so (Minzarari, 2014).

Ukraine has also been involved in resolving this conflict (*Agreement*, 1995). At the same time, the ceasefire was provided by units of the 14th Army, which remain in Transnistria. NATO’s top military commander said that Russia had a large force on Ukraine’s eastern border and said he was worried it could pose a threat to Moldova’s mainly Russian-speaking separatist Transdnistria region (*NATO*, 2014). They continue to pose a threat to Ukraine, Moldova and EU. Future solutions to Transnistrian problem are important for further more detailed research.

RUSSIA IN CHECHEN CONFLICT

The first (1994–1996) and second (1999–2009) Chechen wars took place on the territory of Russia, which allowed it to conceal war crimes. The Russians lost the First Chechen War. Russia’s federal security service (FSB) organised kidnappings of western citizens to change the real image of the Chechen people in Russia and the West. The FSB agent Adam Deniyev founded the first Wahhabi organisation in Chechnya. S. Basayev, who collaborated with Russia’s military intelligence Service, carried out a series of terrorist attacks in Russia. Gradually, the Chechen national liberation movement was transformed into a jihadist movement. The FSB carried out the infamous bomb attacks in Russia, which, together with Basayev’s land offensive in Dagestan, became the reason for starting the Second Chechen War, won by the Russians. After the attack on the president of Chechnya A. Kadyrov, power was taken over by his son, the dictator R. Kadyrov, who is still ruling today, and is V. Putin’s right-hand man in the North Caucasus (Szklański, 2020).

The international community has hardly been involved in verifying the results of Russia’s “peacekeeping operations.” No one tried to stop the outright offences. The Chechen issue has been on the agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights. However, the resolution was not approved. In 2002, Russia suspended the OSCE in Chechnya. UN special rapporteurs on torture and illegal, arbitrary and summary executions did not wait for the opportunity to visit the region. Only a few foreign embassies have shown interest in obtaining information on human rights violations from primary sources (Denber, 2004).

As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has been able to bring the situation in Chechnya out of UN control. She put a lot of effort into presenting the situation as stabilising, but could not resolve the situation.

In 2003, the conflict spread to Ingushetia, where federal forces committed similar offences. The governments of the US and EU continued to negotiate with Russia on political and economic issues (missile defense, energy, common policy in the Middle East). It cannot justify the reluctance of the international community to uphold human rights guarantees and hold Russia accountable. The federal government has set up a human rights body in Chechnya, represented by the president's special envoy for human and civil rights and freedoms. The established national commission worked formally. But most cases did not go to court, and no cases of torture were ever prosecuted (Denber, 2004).

The international community has come to terms with Russia's position on preventing international observers from entering Chechnya. Through diplomatic and other impunity, the Russian government has clarified the political will of the international community, and tens of thousands of Russian law enforcement officials have become accustomed to impunity (Denber, 2004).

Russian policy towards Chechnya is based on the assumption that Chechnya is an integral part of the Russian. Consequently, the Russian authorities have not considered the possibility of the republic's independence since the beginning of the conflict. As noted by Wańczyk (2006), such policies have three models, based on certain principles, which were shaped to achieve short-term and long-term goals. The first model was aimed at weakening the position of separatist politicians and undermining Chechnya's political and economic stability. The second assumed the elimination of the opponent – militants seeking Chechnya's independence from Russia – and that the central authorities would take direct control of the republic. The third scheme starts from slightly different assumptions than the above two. It is based on moving away from external influence and handing over control of events in the republic to the Chechens, but supervised by the central authorities.

RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

The 1992–1993 Georgia-Abkhazia War, in which ethnic Abkhazians effectively extracted northwestern Georgia from Tbilisi's control, is a conflict largely forgotten in the West, despite its high profile re-ignition in August 2008. Ethnic tension between Abkhazians and Georgians was a necessary but not sufficient cause for the conflict. It took an unstable transition in Moscow, and chaotic Russian involvement in the run-up to the conflict, to turn tension into violence. Russia's one-sided role in ending hostilities meant that the conflict's causal issues were left frozen, only to be violently thawed fifteen years later (Petersen, 2008). Until 2008, Russia was the sole peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia under UN Security Council resolutions. This was supported by all members of the UN SC (*Resolution 849*, 1993).

EU Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1633 (2008) stated that the beginning of this war was the result of an escalation of tensions that had begun much earlier. Full-scale hostilities took place after the shelling of Tskhinvali on 7 August 2008, classified as the disproportionate use of military force by Georgia, albeit on its territory, in viola-

tion of international law and the obligation to resolve the conflict peacefully (*Resolution 1647, 2009*).

Russia's counterattack was also found to be inconsistent with the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian law. This has led to Russia's occupation of much of Georgia, and the destruction of infrastructure, which can be seen as either a direct encroachment on Georgia's sovereignty or an extension of its influence (*Resolution 1647, 2009*). Russia still controls 20 percent of Georgia's land territory, and Georgia's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone off the coast of Abkhazia have long been treated as an integral part of Russia's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (Åtland, 2021: 319).

Both sides of the conflict did not rule out the possibility of using military force. The format of the peacekeeping operation did not achieve the set goals, and the peacekeeping forces failed to fulfil the task of protecting the lives and property of citizens in the conflict zone. Calls for discussion of a change in the format of the peacekeeping operation and the conflict resolution process were rejected by the South Ossetian and Russian sides (*Resolution 1647, 2009*).

UN resolutions have identified such unacceptable actions of Russia on the territory of Georgia as: "protection of citizens abroad;" recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; violations of human rights and humanitarian law (premeditated killings, deaths and injuries of civilians, destruction of property); indiscriminate use of force; looting; ethnic cleansing (*Resolution 1647, 2009*).

Resolution No 1647 (2009) of the EU Parliamentary Assembly shows signs of systematic violations of international law. Required (*Resolution 1647, 2009*): from Georgia – fulfilment of unfulfilled requirements, bringing the law on the occupied territories in line with international norms. From the Russia – full implementation of GA UN resolution 33 1633 (2008), including revocation of the decision to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, withdrawal from the Akhkolgori region, reduction of military presence to the level of conflict, consent to OSCE mission, cessation of ethnic cleansing, human rights violations, prosecution of perpetrators (as done by Georgia), cessation of administrative provocations border, ensuring the return of migrants.

Many UN members have seen Russia's military conflicts in Chechnya, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine as almost internal to the CIS. In addition, the international community has always expected the aggressor to perform their role as a peacekeeper in the post-Soviet space. Also, the geopolitical ambitions of the aggressor were not taken into account even by the victim states. It is evidenced by the Agreement on the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Military Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of Moldova of 21 July 1992 (*Agreement, 1992*), which was concluded between Moldova and Russia.

RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

Ukrainian-Russian relations in history took place under the desire of the Moscow principality and its successors – the Russian Empire, the USSR and Russia to prevent the independence of the Ukrainian state (Horbulin, 2016). To force Ukraine

to renounce its newly declared independence, an official Russian delegation arrived in Kyiv on 28 August 1991, threatening to revise the borders (Horbulin, 2016). On 9 July 1993, in violation of international law, the Russian parliament passed a resolution on the Russian status of the city of Sevastopol. Since the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian political elites have not doubted that under the influence of economic pressure, the former Soviet republics will be forced to unite with Russia into a single state. They tried to rebuild the illusion of good neighbourly relations. Without this, it was impossible to sign the “Budapest Memorandum” on Ukraine’s renunciation of its nuclear state status through the voluntary transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia.

Despite the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia in 1997, in 2003 Russia tried to capture the Ukrainian island of Tuzla in the Kerch Strait (Horbulin, 2016). In 2003, the Agreement between Ukraine and Russian on the Ukrainian-Russian State Border was signed. At the same time, Russia has constantly slowed down the demarcation process, i.e. marking the state border with Ukraine on the ground. Ukraine was forced to unilaterally mark it with information signs. Russia has consistently refused to define the line of the common state border in the Azov and Black Seas.

Since 2008, Russia’s strategic documents have stated that Ukraine cannot be an independent state. Since 2006, the Russian FSB has set up groups to promote the ideology of “Russian World” in Ukraine through social networks. Comprehensive support was provided to pro-Russian political parties for their victory in the electoral process to enter the legislative and executive branches of government as well as local self-government bodies. For all manifestations of aggression, the international community used the tactics of reconciliation of the aggressor, which, in turn, pushed it to more bold violations of international law.

In 2014, Russia took advantage of the political crisis in Ukraine and the presence of its Black Sea Fleet military base on the territory of Ukraine in Crimea and began the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine since 2014 has, among other consequences, led also to a temporary loss of government control over Donbass (Kresin, Kresina, 2021: 279). Since 2014, Russia has blocked decisions on the situation in Ukraine by the UN SC. It should be emphasized that since 2014, the majority of Russians have supported the actions of Putin’s political regime toward the independent Ukraine.

GA UN Resolution No 68/262 27.03.2014 expressed support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. It also identified the illegality of Russia’s referendum in Crimea and the illegality of changing the status of Crimea (*Resolution 68/262*, 2014).

Russia’s violations of human rights in Crimea from 2016 to 2021 are reflected in numerous statements, reports and UN resolutions. They were aimed at destroying the pro-Ukrainian part of the local population and suppressing democracy.

The long and creeping illegal annexation of Crimea began long before 2014. Russia has been preparing for this step since 1992. Then the Supreme Soviet of Russia recognized the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1954, which included Crimea in the Ukrainian SSR, as having no legal force.

According to the Russian leadership, the occupation of Crimea was to become a springboard for the occupation of all of Ukraine. But the Russians were not ready for the Ukrainians to stand firm in defending Ukraine's independence.

At the same time, the lack of adequate response from the international community to Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula has led to the escalation of the military conflict in the Ukrainian Donbas. Russia's signing of the Minsk Agreements under the auspices of the OSCE did not stop the shelling of Ukrainian-controlled territory, continue to supply weapons and ammunition to illegal armed groups and use its troops in the temporarily occupied Donbas, according to numerous OSCE reports.

With the beginning of the open invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia blocked the adoption of a UN SC resolution. The aggressor hoped that Ukraine would not be supported by the international community. At the GA UN, Resolution No ES 11/L.1 of 2 February 2022 condemned Russia's aggression. Of the 193 UN members, 141 have voted in favour of an immediate cessation of Russia's use of force against Ukraine and the withdrawal of its troops from its internationally recognized territory (*Resolution ES 11/L.1, 2022*).

In our view, the role of the OSCE and NATO (The North, 1949) in ensuring international peace and security remains low. Thus, a special OSCE monitoring mission has been deployed in Ukraine since 2014 to reduce tensions and ensure peace, stability, security, monitoring and supporting the implementation of all OSCE principles and commitments. At the same time, Russia has refused to extend the scope of its activities to the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (*Decision, 2014*). From 2014 to 2021, the OSCE Mission's daily reports recorded systematic violations of the Minsk Agreements by Russia, but it did not bear any responsibility for this. Russia's membership in the Council of Europe was suspended only on 16 March 2022 (*Resolution, 2022*).

With the beginning of the open invasion of Ukraine, Russia made it impossible for the OSCE Mission to Ukraine. Following the order of the OSCE Secretary General dated 24.02.2022, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine carried out the temporary evacuation of all its international members from the area of activity (*OSCE, 2022*).

For a long time, the world did not recognise the importance of Ukraine and the importance of warnings about Russia's preparations for war against Ukraine and did not apply the necessary harsh preventive sanctions against Russia to make Moscow feel that any aggression will not escape them. But Russia has always known that a few steps are against our state, a few steps in our region – and the consequences will be felt on all continents. That is why Russia needs control over Ukraine. That is why the basic interest of the world now is to help defend Ukraine (Orlova, 2022).

During 2014–2022, we note the presence of all signs of aggression identified by UN GA Resolution № 3314 (XXIX) of 14.12.1974, which are listed in the table 1 (*Resolution 3314, 1974*). In 2022, Russia carried out an act of aggression in a coalition with the republic of Belarus, which provided its territory for this purpose.

Russian aggression is also accompanied by the commission of numerous crimes in Ukraine, the characteristics of which are defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (*Rome, 1998*). In particular, in almost all settlements liberated

by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the facts of genocide were revealed, consisting of the intention to destroy the national and ethnic identity of the Ukrainian people. Similar crimes were committed by Russian military in Chechnya, Moldova, Georgia and Syria. However, Russia has never taken adequate responsibility for this.

Table 1

Signs of aggression of the Russia in military conflicts

Signs of aggression in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) dated 14.12.1974	Territory			
	Moldova	Chechnya*	Georgia	Ukraine
	1992	1994–1996, 1999–2009	1991–1993, 2008	Since 2014
Invasion or an attack	+		+	+
Annexation of the territory				+
Bombing		+	+	+
Blockade of ports			+	+
Attack on the armed forces	+		+	+
Use of the territory of another state				+
Giving a state territory to another state for aggression				+
Sending armed gangs or irregular forces, mercenaries				+

Note: * – the territory of Chechnya is part of the Russia in contrast to other territories.

In the short, medium and long term, the factor of Russia’s hybrid threat will play a significant role in shaping the security environment, which makes the issue of national security and state stability especially relevant. Due to the lack of effective international mechanisms for regulating modern legal relations, the basic institutions of international law are weakening.

The armed aggression of Russia against Ukraine is a direct proof and consequence of the attempts to revise the rules established after the end of the Second World War.

Differences in values and interests between states and attempts of individual states to reconsider the existing world order by changing borders and capturing new territories are the most pressing threat not only to Ukraine but to the whole world.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The imperfection of international law on the prevention of aggression, its cessation and prosecution of the aggressor country, including political and military leadership, the insufficient response from the international community, UN member states, and attempts to appease Russia as an aggressor country had the opposite effect and led to the growth of its aggressiveness in foreign policy.

Receiving status as a permanent member of the UN SC by fraud and it has allowed Russia to block any decision by the institution against Russia’s aggression toward other states while brutally violating international humanitarian law. During Putin’s rule, a fascist regime has emerged in Russia that ignores international law, uses economic, political, nuclear blackmail and military force against other countries, and threatens the world.

2. The international anti-putin coalition formed after Russia's aggression against Ukraine should strengthen Ukraine's comprehensive support for its victory in the Russian-Ukrainian war and weaken Russia, to reduce its capacity for future aggression.

3. It is necessary to take further political and diplomatic steps to expand the coalition at the expense of countries that, for economic or political reasons, take a neutral or uncertain position.

4. Russia, as an aggressor state, its political and military leadership must be held accountable for aggression against Ukraine, genocide against the Ukrainian people, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

5. It is also necessary to consider the responsibility of the political and military leadership of the Republic of Belarus for participating in Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

6. Deprive Russia of its status as a permanent member of the UN SC for abusing the right of veto, which has led to violations of UN principles and norms of international humanitarian law.

7. To prevent future abuses of the right of veto by other countries – permanent members of the UN SC to amend the UN Charter, which would prevent the use of the veto by the aggressor country.

8. In the framework of UN reform, to increase the role of the General Assembly, namely to introduce a rule that makes its decisions binding on the Security Council (for example, when 75% of UN member states voted in favour), and a separate procedure for overcoming veto.

9. First of all, to submit to the UN General Assembly the issue of terminating the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Moldova, Georgia, and other states that have raised such issues before the UN.

10. Given that UN reform measures will be blocked by Russia and possibly other states, Ukraine needs to urgently address national security issues in the postwar period by joining the European Union, creating an effective regional security system with its allies, especially the USA, UK, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and other interested countries.

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the issue of violation of the principle of territorial integrity (integrity) or political independence of states from 1946 to 2022. The approach is based on the study and

understanding of domestic and foreign literary sources, statistics, legal acts. So, the historic, comparative, formal juridical and prognostic methods will be used. Russia gained the status of an independent entity in the international arena immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Almost immediately, it began to show signs of aggression. To promote its geopolitical ambitions, it uses gaps in international law, information and psychological measures, corruption, mercenaries, collaborators, blackmail, the law of force, and tries to rewrite history. The course of military conflicts involving Russia in Moldova, Chechnya, Georgia, Syria and Ukraine shows that the scale of violations of international treaties, human rights and the rules of warfare has increased in line with the strengthening of its military capabilities. During the hostilities on the territory of independent Ukraine, Russia showed a complete list of signs of aggression, as defined by UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974. This shows that before the armed attack on Ukraine, the aggressor was convinced that it could not be brought to justice and punished. It also hoped that his next victim would not be able to receive international political, economic, military and social assistance. Some actions of Russia in the international arena have signs of state terrorism. During the last ten years, a fascist regime has formed in Russia. The abuse of the veto did not lead to the expulsion of the aggressor country from the UN SC.

To stop Russia's aggression and prevent similar developments in the future, the issues of improving international law, bringing to justice the political and military leadership of the republic of Belarus and Russia, improving the UN Charter, the powers of the UN General Assembly, depriving Russia of the right to participate in peacekeeping operations.

Keywords: international law, international security, Russian aggression, Russian-Ukrainian war, UN Charter, signs of aggression

AKTUALNE ZAGADNIENIA POKOJU I BEZPIECZEŃSTWA Z UWZGLĘDNIENIEM AGRESYWNEJ POLITYKI FEDERACJI ROSYJSKIEJ

STRESZCZENIE

W niniejszym artykule podjęto kwestię naruszenia zasady integralności terytorialnej (integralności) lub niezależności politycznej państw w latach 1946–2022. Podejście to opiera się na badaniu i zrozumieniu krajowych i zagranicznych źródeł literackich, statystyk, aktów prawnych. Wykorzystane zostaną więc metody historyczne, porównawcze, formalne prawne i prognostyczne. Ustalono, że Rosja po otrzymaniu statusu samodzielnego podmiotu na arenie międzynarodowej, zaraz po rozpadzie ZSRR, niemal natychmiast zaczęła wykazywać oznaki agresji. Aby promować swoje geopolityczne ambicje, wykorzystuje luki w prawie międzynarodowym, środki informacji i wpływu psychologicznego, korupcję, szantaż, prawo siły, najemników, kolaborantów, próbując napisać historię na nowo. Przebieg konfliktów zbrojnych Rosji w Republice Mołdawii, Czeczenii, Gruzji, Syrii i na Ukrainie pokazuje, że skala naruszeń traktatów międzynarodowych, praw człowieka i zasad prowadzenia działań wojennych rosła wraz ze wzrostem jej zdolności militarnych. Podczas działań wojennych na terytorium niepodległej Ukrainy Rosja wykazała pełną listę oznak agresji, zgodnie z rezolucją Zgromadzenia Ogólnego ONZ nr 3314 (XXIX) z 14 grudnia 1974 r. Świadczy to o tym, że przed atakiem zbrojnym na Ukrainę agresor był przekonany, że nie można go ścigać i ukarać. Miał też nadzieję, że jego następna ofiara nie będzie mogła otrzymać międzynarodowej pomocy politycznej, gospodarczej, wojskowej i społecznej. Niektóre działania Rosji na arenie międzynarodowej noszą znamiona terroryzmu państwowego. W ciągu ostatnich dziesięciu lat w Rosji uformował się faszystowski

reżim. Nadużycie weta nie doprowadziło do wykluczenia kraju-agresora z Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ.

Aby powstrzymać agresję Rosji i zapobiec podobnym wydarzeniom w przyszłości, zmian wymaga prawo międzynarodowe, należy też postawić przed sądem przywódców politycznych i wojskowych Republiki Białoruś i Rosji. Powinno się także uaktualnić Kartę Narodów Zjednoczonych, zmienić uprawnienia Zgromadzenia Ogólnego ONZ oraz pozbawić Rosję prawa udziału w operacjach pokojowych.

Słowa kluczowe: prawo międzynarodowe, bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, rosyjska agresja, wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska, Karta ONZ, przejawy agresji