

**REVIEWS OF SCIENTIFIC EVENTS
AND JOURNALS**

SIPRI Yearbook 2018. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security and Report from the 3rd Meeting of the Consortium of Academic Departments of Strategic (and Security) Studies

Since 1969, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been publishing a yearbook dedicated to global military expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear potential, armed conflicts and multilateral peace operations. The analyses in the yearbook are based on the most recent information on the arms trade, peace and international security. The latest issue (*Yearbook 2018*) concerns 2017, and focuses on the three issues crucial for the study of peace: armed conflicts and conflict management, military spending and armaments, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Due to the size of the *SIPRI Yearbook 2018*, this study discusses the most important topics discussed in the *Yearbook*, in chronological order.

The *Introduction* to the latest issue argues that the trend which was discussed in the preceding *SIPRI Yearbooks* (2015, 2016 and 2017), namely the growing number of conflicts breaking out in more and more locations across the globe, and the increasing pace of armament, has been maintained. As was the case before, also in 2017, the long-lasting conflict in Ukraine continued and bordered on confrontation between Russia and the West. This pessimism is rooted in the continuously negative global indicators for peace and security, such as more military spending, flourishing arms trading, increasingly brutal conflicts in the Middle East and parts of Africa, and the continuing advancements in military technology. Additionally, multilateral and bilateral agreements, which are the fundamental components of the armament control system at present, are politically undermined due to mounting strategic competition between the major powers. Firstly, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons adopted in 2017 failed to win support from important states, in particular developed states with nuclear potential. Such a decision demonstrates that a potential change is not feasible. Although the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted, the nuclear powers continue to clearly oppose it. The essence of the dispute on complete nuclear disarmament boils down to the philosophy of different attitudes to the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. Secondly, the disarmament process initiated during the Cold War is no longer underway, as the currently binding New START expires in 2021 with no prospects for further agreements. Thirdly, the tensions between the major powers (the USA and Russia) have remained stark, particularly due to the annexation of Crimea and continued Russian interference in Ukraine's internal affairs. It can therefore be concluded that the Russian empire has departed from the idea of integration with the West, at least in the short or medium term. NATO has witnessed an internal conflict triggered primarily by the transformation of Turkey during Erdogan's presidency. Another disquieting trend has been maintained in the East, with tensions between India and Pakistan, the growing potential of the People's Republic of China and intensifying rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.


The first section of the *SIPRI Yearbook 2018* addresses armed conflicts and conflict management, or rather describes the matters discussed in the *Introduction* in more detail. Firstly,

the events in 2017 confirmed the reversal of the post-Cold War disarmament trend identified two years earlier. Additionally, conflicts entered urban areas increasing the civilian death toll by 42 percent compared to 2016. Explosive weapons killed more civilians than military. Forced displacements of civilians reached a record-breaking level of ca. 70 million persons. Food crises were reported in seven countries: Afghanistan, Central African Republic (CAR), Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Secondly, the political situation in the Americas is stabilizing, and in 2017 only Colombia was a stage of active conflict. However, political violence and organized crime failed to be controlled, especially in the largest Latin American cities. Thirdly, in Asia and Oceania alone, five countries were involved in armed conflicts: Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Pakistan and the Philippines. The sources of those conflicts boil down to the activities of Islamic State, widespread violence and impunity for the security forces of selected countries, and maintaining armaments at a high level. The stabilization of the situation in Nepal and Sri Lanka was an optimistic indicator, at least in 2017. Fourthly, there were two armed conflicts in Eastern Europe: Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia and Azerbaijan). Unresolved (inactive) conflicts continued on the territories of Cyprus, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Transnistria) and Kosovo. West European countries continued their counter-terrorism policy. Fifthly, seven conflicts could be found in the Middle East and North Africa: Egypt, Iraq, Israel and Palestine, Libya, Syria, Turkey and Yemen. The vast majority of them were interconnected through regional powers, as well as external actors. The conflicts were the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a result of regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and of an attempt to revive Islamic State. In Egypt, human rights have not been marginalized to such an extent for decades, and tensions were rising in Sinai. Iraqi authorities faced the challenge of the reconstruction (civilization) of territories once held by Islamic State, especially around Mosul, and of the reconciliation of three very different communities: Shia, Kurdish and Sunni. The war in Syria led to over half of its population being displaced, and 6.5 million were at risk of acute food insecurity, as was the case in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia's actions resulted in 17 million people (60% of the population) facing food insecurity. Sixthly, in Sub-Saharan Africa, armed conflicts were active in Mali, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan. Burundi, Cameroon, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Sudan and Zimbabwe experienced post-war tensions. Events in 2018 confirmed the observation that continued antagonisms were triggered by supranational entities (Islamist groups, criminal networks or armed groups) fueling hatred in people living in extreme poverty, economic instability or corruption, and by the internationalization of the counter-terrorist combat in Africa conducted by France and the United States. Sixthly, in contrast to 2016, 2017 was a hectic year for peacekeeping operations, due to the increased dynamics of stabilization operations. Interestingly, the role of the United Nations was slowly but consistently reducing (a year on year decrease of personnel involved in peacekeeping operations by 7.6%) in favor of other entities (a 2.3% increase in non-UN personnel). The number of peacekeeping operations increased to 63 in 2017, one more than in 2016, but the involvement of regional economic communities in Africa increased significantly. This was mainly due to their reluctance to adopt solutions imposed by the UN under the peace agenda, according to which increased attention is given to political processes taking place in African countries, peace-building and conflict prevention. The extent of the national sovereignty of the host state of peacekeeping operations became increasingly disputable. Additionally, some countries, such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, favored specific assistance, especially military assi-

stance, and wanted to decide for themselves on the deployment of peacekeeping forces. In 2017, the number of attacks on UN personnel increased suddenly, revealing an inability to respond quickly to such threats. The overall marginalization of United Nations activities is further strengthened by US President Donald Trump, who undermined the sustainability and predictability of financing peacekeeping operations in Africa. The withdrawal of the main international actor, accompanied by the increased dynamics of events, raises the question of whether the UN can do more for less now.


The second section of the *SIPRI Yearbook 2018* addresses the issues of military expenditure and armaments. It is stressed at the beginning that, in 2017, it amounted to \$1.7 trillion, equivalent to 2.2 percent of global GDP or \$230 per person. Whereas the global increase was 1.1 percent in real terms, it was regionally diverse. Military expenditure in North America fell for the seventh consecutive year (0.2% year on year), while in Eastern Asia it continued to rise for the 23rd year in succession (4.1% year on year). In Western Europe, spending increased for the third consecutive year (1.7% year on year), while in Africa, Central America, the Caribbean and Eastern Europe military spending was lower. Military budgets in the Middle East and South America were higher due to the political situation there. The United States retained their leading position (\$610 billion in 2017), China was second (\$229 billion in 2017) and Saudi Arabia third (\$69.4 billion). Russia's military spending fell by a considerable 20 percent compared to 2016, to \$66.3 billion, making it the fourth largest spender in 2017. The latter illustrates the strong interrelation between armament and oil and gas prices. A similar correlation can be seen in Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan and Venezuela. For these countries, military expenditure between 2014 and 2017 decreased by an average of 16 percent, but the price of oil dropped by over 45 percent. The difference was mostly funded through debt. Importantly, military expenditure transparency leaves much to be desired. There are countries (42 in 2017), including global powers (USA, China, Saudi Arabia and India) that have long failed to duly submit reports on their military spending.

**No. of submissions to the United Nations register of conventional arms
(SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Summary: 8)**



Secondly, the upward trend in international transfers of conventional weapons was maintained in 2017, reaching its highest level since the end of the cold war. The five largest arms suppliers in 2013–17, namely the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China, accounted for 74 percent of the total global volume of exports of weapons. The top five arms importers (India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and China) accounted for 35 percent of total arms imports. Importantly, the Middle East increased its purchase of conventional weapons by as much as 103 percent between 2008–12 and 2013–17, contrary to Europe (a decrease by 22 percent), the Americas (a decrease by 29%), and Africa (by 22 percent).

The trend in transfers of major weapons (SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Summary: 9).



As is the case of military spending, the transparency in conventional arms transfers remains a concern. However, most of the states that have ratified the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty have met their obligation. The total value of the conventional arms trade between states amounted to \$88.4 billion (in 2016, which is the latest year for which data is available), but the total sales of the top 100 players in the armaments sector (excluding China) totaled almost \$375 billion (in 2016, which is the latest year for which data is available) marking the first year of increase since 2010. Thirdly, at the beginning of 2018, nine states formed the nuclear club (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) possessing approximately 14,465 nuclear weapons, of which 3,750 were deployed with operational forces, and nearly 2,000 of which are kept in a state of high operational alert. Overall, inventories of nuclear weapons continue to decline, mainly due to the USA and Russia (which collectively account for approximately 92 percent of global nuclear weapons) reducing their strategic nuclear forces in line with the New START. Transparency concerning nuclear weapons leaves a lot to be desired: the USA, the UK and France have disclosed important information; Russia and China refuse to disclose details; India and Pakistan make statements about some of their missile tests; Israel has a policy of not commenting on the topic and North Korea provides no information whatsoever.

The beginning of the final, third section of the *SIPRI Yearbook 2018* (non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament) emphasizes the core of the first Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The treaty is the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of their total elimination. This is a response to the frustration of non-nuclear weapon states with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) being taken not seriously, even though they acknowledged that it would have no immediate impact on existing nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, the process of the delegitimization and stigmatization of nuclear weapons has been initiated, which is particularly important in the face of the US's and Russia's reluctance to continue disarmament under the New START, which was strengthened by their conflict over the INF Treaty. Additionally, 2017 saw the intensification of work by the Conference on Disarmament, and the Security Council adopted three additional resolutions imposing new or extended sanctions on North Korea in response to its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile testing activities.

World nuclear forces in 2017 (SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Summary: 11)

Country	Deployed warheads	Other warheads	Total inventory
USA	1,750	4,700	6,450
Russia	1,600	5,250	6,850
UK	120	95	215
France	280	20	300
China	–	280	280
India	–	130–140	130–140
Pakistan	–	140–150	140–150
Israel	–	80	80
North Korea	–	(10–20)	(10–20)
Total	3,750	10,715	14,465

Secondly, in 2017, international community endeavored to explain the circumstances of chemical weapon use in Iraq and Syria. The UN Security Council failed to work out a compromise and the talks are most likely to continue next year. Russia, formerly the largest possessor of chemical weapons, completed the destruction of its stockpile in 2017, as required by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Towards the end of 2017, the annual Meeting of States Parties (MSP) to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) agreed a further agenda for the period 2018–2020. Thirdly, in 2017, conventional arms control measures were about expanding international humanitarian law. This encounters obstacles resulting, among other things, from the gaps in humanitarian arms control, international law and national regulations pertaining to disarmament. In 2017, negotiations to address the non-proliferation of conventional weapons continued within the framework of the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention); the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Convention); and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). After Afghanistan and Lebanon joined, the total number of states parties grew to 125. In 2017, work began on new regulations for new or emerging technologies, including lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). For the first time, these discussions took place in

the format of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), and addressed the description of systems under consideration and the implications of human–machine interaction. The issue of the use of incendiary weapons and explosive weapons in populated areas, including the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups, failed to generate new concrete outcomes. The main reason for the lack of consensus was the insufficient number of meetings, further compounded by the fact that some of them were cancelled due to a lack of funding. States parties agreed to discuss both issues further in 2018. As concerns the issue of anti-personnel mines, on the one hand, Sri Lanka and Palestine became the 163rd and 164th states parties to the APM Convention, and Algeria and Mozambique declared themselves free of landmines (nevertheless, 57 states and 4 other areas remained contaminated by mines). On the other one, in 2016 (the most recent data available), global casualties from APMs were at their highest level since 1999, largely as a result of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine and Yemen. Benin and Madagascar ratified the CCM in 2017, bringing the total number of states parties to 102. Unfortunately, cluster munitions continued to be used in Syria and Yemen. Fourthly, global, regional and multilateral efforts continued in 2017 to strengthen controls on the trade in conventional arms and dual-use items connected with conventional, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The main focus was the development of control standards, promotion principles and implementation measures. The implementation of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was impeded by tensions between states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) supporting the treaty. The only solution for now is to report violations of international law to the United Nations, indicate gaps in embargoes, and emphasize the obsolescence of current control measures. The global trend of increasing military spending is working against the ATT, especially in Asia. The greatest concern is the low level of reporting and lack of financial transparency. Thirty-five arms embargoes were in force in 2017: 13 imposed by the UN, 21 by the European Union (EU) and 1 by the League of Arab States. The huge majority of these embargoes covered conventional arms, with the exception of the UN and EU embargoes on Iran and North Korea, and the EU embargo on Russia (dual-use items). 2017 abounded in violations, the scale of which was considerably larger than in the past (investigations by the UN repeatedly revealed large shipments of arms). One arms embargo was imposed in 2017 – on Venezuela. Fifthly, in 2017, trade control lists were updated for each multilateral export control regime – the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement, WA). The goal was to ensure the international community that the control lists continued to cover the often rapid advances in armaments (and account for goods, software and technology). Difficulties with admitting new regime members continued, as exemplified by the response from China and its allies to the admission of India as a WA member (2017) and AG member (beginning of 2018). Sixthly, the issue of intangible transfers of technology (ITT) was not solved in the context of technical data transfer (transfers of knowledge and technical assistance). The main reason for that is the significant compliance costs for companies and research institutes and a lack of knowledge of how to rationally regulate cloud computing and 3D printing.

The final section of the *SIPRI Yearbook 2018* traditionally features annexes (synthetic and chronological). The text of the report is available on <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2018>.

The issues addressed in SIPRI 2018 were partly discussed at the 3rd Meeting of the Consortium of Academic Departments of Strategic (and Security) Studies.

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Report from the 3rd Meeting of the Consortium of Academic Departments of Strategic (and Security) Studies

On May 17, 2019, the 3rd Meeting of the Consortium of Academic Departments of Strategic (and Security) Studies took place at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at the Faculty of International and Political Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. The speakers, moderators and guests were welcomed by Professor Michał Chorośnicki and Professor Roman Kuźniar.

The speaker in the first panel, entitled “The 70th Anniversary of NATO – a Third Youth or a Swan Song”, Professor Arkadiusz Domagała forecasted little or no NATO activity, due not so much to its potential, but to the weak political coherence within the alliance. “After the election of Donald Trump, NATO has become a toolbox of the US.” The threat of the political decomposition of the Alliance is further aggravated by Turkey’s behavior and the resistance of France and Germany regarding the amount of spending proposed by the American president. The second panelist, Professor Aleksander Głogowski pointed out that in Afghanistan the Alliance had failed to meet the goals set by its decision-makers, which means that it would not continue stabilization activities in the short and medium term. Stabilization effects had not been achieved, despite extensive military action; in particular chaos still reigned and Taliban influence had not been marginalized in Afghanistan. “Outside its target area, NATO will rather implement stabilization tasks after natural disasters, as in Pakistan in 2006.” In conclusion, the speaker reminded the audience of the absence of specific provisions under Article 5 and warned about the potential absence of military assistance from the Alliance. Professor Marek Madej also mentioned the difficulties of political cohesion, but he acknowledged the stronger military cohesion of NATO (Wales 2014, Warsaw 2016, Brussels 2018). He observed that NATO strategy was updated every 10 years, but at present, when the time had come for the next update, no talks were even being held. The Alliance should be seen as an entity of regional (European) rather than global security, especially after the bad experience in Afghanistan. The speaker was against treating NATO as a major peacemaker. In his opinion, Russia is the secondary opponent, after the PRC. At the end, he added that the requirement of military spending at the level of 2% of respective national budgets had emerged during the presidency of Barack Obama, and Donald Trump was only enforcing earlier arrangements. The first panel was concluded with a few comments: Professor Stanisław Koziej spoke of the military significance and political weakness of NATO; Professor Roman Kuźniar indicated that the American presence had a calming effect in the region; Professor Andrzej Mania argued that the lack of a strategy in NATO was not unnatural, because it is the Americans, Chinese or Russians who must have a strategy; Professor Michał Chorośnicki mentioned giving too much attention to tertiary details, such as the Suwalski isthmus; General Anatol Czaban indicated that NATO’s potential exceeds that of Russia seventeen times, and that British submarines had been launched; and Dr. Maciej Magiera commented on the ‘conservative revolution’ in Europe and its consequences for institutional cohesion.

The second panel, entitled “The EU/CSDP versus the pressure from power politics” began with an introduction by Professor Roman Kuźniar who spoke about Donald Trump’s transactional attitude in international politics and concluded that “there is no power without the state.” Professor Stanisław Koziej, as the first speaker, presented three scenarios for the role of the EU in the modern world, and considered that of the EU (economic potential) coexisting with NATO (military potential) most likely. However, a problem remains of how to divide tasks in such a tandem. The second speaker, Professor Janusz Węc, argued that transatlantic activity would continue to be divided into NATO military operations and EU crisis management as was the case in the past. However, he stressed the EU’s internal need for hard power, although there is a problem with command and transportation systems, etc. The last speaker, Dr. Bartłomiej Nowak, continued the line of thought of his predecessors, adding that over the last five years, mainly since Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, the ESDP had changed more than throughout the 70 years of NATO. Due to EU diversity, based on the ‘integration complex’, the joint defense capability of the EU is anticipated to be achieved within about 15 years. Summarizing the panel, Professor Roman Kuźniar stressed the significant role of Germany in EU defense policy, and more precisely ‘German restraint’ in spending on armaments.

The third panel, entitled “Dispute over Africa – the policy of powers towards Africa” was opened by General Anatol Czaban, and then the first panelist, Professor Jacek Pawłowski discussed the negative impact that vast uncontrolled areas in Africa have on international relations and their perception. The next speaker, Professor Kamila Pronińska emphasized the significant increase in military (international) involvement in African armed conflicts, which results from various powers (Europe, the USA, China) readying themselves for international rivalry. They even resort to the ‘instrumentalization of dissatisfied persons,’ which means persuading indigenous populations to perpetrate criminal and terrorist activities. The last speaker, Dr. Ewa Szczepankiewicz-Rudzka, expanded this theme and added that any change in Maghreb (and probably in the rest of Africa) is possible only with the support of the army. However, one cannot take shortcuts and use the army for the forceful democratization of the Maghreb countries (‘wild democratization’).

Maciej MAGIERA

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Russian Scientific Journals in the Area of International Relations – 2018 Review

The paper constitutes a review of articles published in 2018 on the pages of Russian academic journals dealing with international relations. The author has selected texts from issues of: “Russia in Global Affairs,” “International Trends. Journal of International Relations Theory and World Policy”, “Polis. Political Studies”, “Comparative Politics. Russia” and “International Affairs (Russian version).”¹ The presented articles have been analyzed in the context of thematic groups.

The main theme, exciting absolute majority of Russian authors in the field of international relations and international politics, is the theme of the imperfections of the modern system of international relations and politics, particularly in closest relation to the Russian Federation and the inevitability of its changes. For example, the article «Fast current moment» begins with the author’s introduction that “the deformations and stresses in the global international system of relation has been accumulating and simmering for many years, and now all these things is spilled out. The nature of the changes in the modern just world be realize – it is difficult to get rid of the inertia of thinking after the Cold War and the temptation to find a parallel in history” (Tsigankov, Trenin, Lomanov, etc., 2018: 14–22). In some aspects, is very evident the fundamental contradiction between the “Russian” and “US-European” view of the modern international relations system. For example, in the article „Russia in XXI century: hopes and achievements” the author notes that “the word of revision is the revision of the existing state of affairs, including, perhaps, in relation to the modern world. What, in fact, is Russia striving for, wishing to pursue a more independent political and economic course” (Lukin, Oznobishev, 2018: 180–188). This contradiction in the assessment of the state of contemporary international relations to date has reached the level of a fundamentally different assessment of the fundamental terms and extremely narrows the space for political and for a strictly neutral and scientific dialogue between the parties. Another example of the terminological differences is presented in the article “the discussion about the power images in international relations theory” where the author notes a serious linguistic discrepancy between the definition of “strength” of the term traditionally well-established in the Russian and English science (Yudin, 2018: 84–99). At the same time, these differences did not go unnoticed and in the internal Russian politics. For example, some researchers have noted fundamental differences in political discourse between representatives of Russian parliamentary parties and the opposition, but not parliamentary parties. According to the research, opposition political parties and movements in Russia categorically disagree on the assessment of all key aspects of Russian foreign policy – such as military actions in Syria, involvement in the military conflict in Ukraine, etc. At the same time, a single opposite view on foreign policy activity among opposition movements also does not exist. Overall, the images of the “quality” of foreign policy directly related to

¹ The specificity of most Russian scientific journals lies in the limited number of articles (and translations) in English. The absolute majority of articles are presented only in Russian. Thus, the article quoted in English in the case of the English-language version is officially available. Russian-language articles without any English translation are quoted in the author’s translation.

political preferences and conditionally divided into the “liberal,” “nationalist” and “socialist” view (Ponomarev, Mailis, 2018: 108–123).

However, a critical view along with a categorical request for a change in the global system of international relations is not totally dominant in the Russian scientific discourse. Thus, in certain cases, it is expressed well-founded fear that the request for a radical modernization of the world political system should include the experience of all previous systems, and not only comply with the discontented parties or countries. At the same time, the requirements for upholding its own sovereignty and a set of conditionally understood national-cultural traditions are presented to the authors as a natural consequence of the increasingly pronounced complication of world politics (Gadjiev, 2018: 81–89).

Another large volume of the articles in leading Russian scientific journals devoted to various aspects of the current relations between Russia and many European countries and European union and another European subnational structures. At the same time, it should be noted that very often in these articles are the European countries in the form of the «Significant Other» (according to the H. S. Sulliwán theory), and rarely focus on specific mutual relations between Russia and one of the European countries. In the article, named as “Defence cooperation models at the northern and on the eastern flanks of the EU (Norden and Visegrad group experience)” author examines the general characteristics of the development of defense initiatives by sub-regional communities such as the Visegrad Group (V-4) and the Nordic Defense Community (NORDEFKO). He also paid attention to the process of interconnection between European and Euro-Atlantic integration, on the one hand, and sub-regional cooperation formats, on the other. He is noted that the sub-regional defense projects and programs are not able to compete with the EU and NATO projects and are currently the most in like «in addition» to it. According to the author, in the current context of increased global uncertainty and growing security challenges, such projects are «little» regionalization have high chances of success (Nadochey, 2018: 9–40).

As noted earlier, in the Russian foreign policy studies are not very popular “key studies,” dedicated to international relations of Russia with the selected countries, and specific aspects of the political development of the chosen country. Especially interesting are the exceptions to this principle, one of which is devoted to the study of a complex system of conflict relations between Poland and the European Union’s current leaderboard (Klemeshev, Vorozheina, 2018: 17–28). The authors focus only on the foreign policy aspects of the conflict between Warsaw and Brussels, while practically not analyzed on the complex set of domestic political, economic and other reasons that influenced the development of this conflict. In conclusion, the authors propose four main scenarios with which this confrontation can be finished – two “positive” and two “negative.” The «positive» scenarios Poland achieves the status of a regional leader in Central and Eastern Europe in the system of a reformed European Union. Differences in the scenarios consisting in the possible ways to institutionalize this process – through the Visegrad Group, or as part of the Polish foreign policy doctrine written by E. Giedroyc and E. Meroshevski. In a negative scenario, according to Russian authors, Poland remain in the status of the eternal opponent of Brussels, but with no real abilities to influence the direction of the main European Union policies, or be forced to radically change its own foreign policy after the election would be victorious for the Polish liberal opposition.

Another important trend in Russian foreign policy research is clearly seen the trend in the study of various aspects of Russian-Chinese relations. In some cases, such studies seem frankly complementary to China and its foreign policy and practically do not contain any crit-

icism (Lecsiutina, 2018: 60–72). For example, in the Russian scientific journal “Comparative Politics Russia” were published the detailed results of a large conference specifically devoted to the consequences of the 19th Congress of the CCP² and the analysis of policy statements made by the leadership of the PRC³ (Article E, 2018: 140–159). The authors thoroughly discuss the transformation of political power in the PRC, analyze the names of the new members of the Political Bureau in the Central Committee of CCP, evaluate the new goals of socio-economic development and weigh the chances of different modernization models and its effectiveness. Another analysis is devoted to the transformation of national interests and foreign policy priorities of the PRC, relations between the PRC and the USA, the PRC and Russia, as well as the PRC and East Asian countries. Also published is a program interview of the Russian ambassador to the PRC, Andrei Denisov, who notes that “the current Russian-Chinese relations is the best in the all our history” (Interaffairs, 2018).

Another analysis is devoted to various aspects of China’s military strategy, and the assumption is that China is increasing the volume of its own nuclear capabilities in order to achieve complete «nuclear» equality with the United States, and in the future – even limit any serious opportunities for US actions in the Southeast Asia region (Kashin, 2018: 72–84).

Summarizing the results of this analysis, it can be noted that the main trend in the research of Russian scientific publications analyzing foreign policy is global and local crises, both domestic and foreign policy. At the same time, such studies often represented excessively global and cover an extremely broad and general theoretical aspects of international relations. The second trend in the Russian international policy research is the «turn to the East». According to this internal political trend the main focus of Russian scientific interest has clearly shifted towards PRC. And finally, it is worth noting a clear drop out of the scientific trend of the system of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Perhaps the reason for this phenomenon consisting in the excessive media aggression both sides of the conflict and the background of information warfare in the Russian and Ukrainian media. This situation has led to a reduction of scientific contacts between Russian and Ukrainian scientists and current situation is still not so friendly process of making balanced and unbiased analysis of the current status of the relations between Russia and Ukraine.

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² Officially named as Chinese Communist Party.

³ Officially named as People’s Republic of China.

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The United States and Poland after 1989, Kraków, 27 May, 2019

On May 27, 2019, in the Auditorium Maximus of the Jagiellonian University, a debate on the recent history of Polish-American relations took place. The Ambassadors of the USA to Poland Victor Ashe (2004–2009) and Stephen Mull (2012–2015) and Polish Ambassadors to the USA Janusz Reiter (2005–2007) and Maciej Kozłowski (1993–1995 as *chargé d'affaires*) took part in the discussion. The panel was moderated by TVN24 journalist Jacek Stawiski and hosted by the US Consulate General in Kraków and the Jagiellonian University.

The event started with an official welcoming by the Rector of the Jagiellonian University Prof. dr hab. med. Wojciech Nowak. The first question to the panelists concerned their personal memories about the breakthrough year of 1989. Mr. Mull remembered his first posting to Poland (1984–1986), during which he was asked to write a memo on whether the democratization of Poland was possible. Though he came to the conclusion that this would eventually happen, he absolutely did not expect it to happen so fast. Mr. Reiter stressed the fact that in 1989 the discussion in Poland was very much focused on the future of Germany. He had come to the conclusion then that relations with Germany and the USA were decisive for Poland's national security. In this context, he was worried that the fall of the Berlin Wall would shift the attention of the international community from Poland to Germany. Mr. Ashe spoke about the relevance of Poland as a topic of US domestic politics. He also pointed out that Lech Wałęsa's speech to Congress on November 15, 1989 marked the first appearance of a person not in public office in the US Congress. At the time, this was a clear message of US support for the region. Mr. Kozłowski added that the high level of recognition of John Paul II and Lech Wałęsa aroused the sympathies of the American public and their interest in Poland. Another crucial factor was also the young employees of the State Department, like Stephen Mull, who were curious about our region.

The next question concerned the panelists' outlook on the rapid change that then took place, and how the United States supported Poland on its road to democracy and NATO. Mr. Mull observed that in 1991 the Soviet Union still existed. This aroused concerns that too rapid change might end like the 'Carnival of Solidarity' in 1981. Therefore, the United States was very cautious in its contacts with Solidarity and the Polish United Workers' Party. The transformation speeded up after the Round Table talks. This process was supported by the United States, which in April 1989 established the Polish American Enterprise Fund, which was the first US support program to eventually generate profit. Mr. Kozłowski emphasized the importance of US moral support for the still small-scale opposition. Also the reduction of Poland's debt was a huge support which positively impacted the economic reforms of Leszek Balcerowicz. Mr. Ashe mentioned the fortunate election of George W. Bush as US President in 1988. Unlike many other US presidents, he already possessed experience in international politics when taking office. Mr. Reiter was of the same opinion, though he warned against retrospective determinism. Though President George W. Bush acted cautiously, he had a clearly defined goal: to prevent the rise of a neutral Germany in the center of Europe, since this would have meant the end of NATO and, by this token, the end of Central and Eastern European countries' dreams of freedom and democracy. Mr. Re-

iter explained that, through Germany, Poland became a neighbor of the European Union and NATO, thus moving closer to both organizations. In the Ambassador's assessment, it would have been impossible for Poland to bypass a neutral Germany back then. Avoiding such a scenario was, in the opinion of Mr. Reiter, "a masterpiece of American diplomacy." Mr. Kozłowski spoke about the deep changes in the understanding of international politics after departing from the Nixon doctrine, which separated the world into spheres of influence, whereby certain security interests were considered legitimized (in the same way making others non-legitimized). This departure was not univocal, since voices could be heard in the United States that the Yalta system was stable and secure, while its alternatives were dangerous and could lead to unpredictable consequences.

Mr. Stawiski's next question concerned Poland in the grey zone of security in the 1990s. Back then, Poland consistently worked towards its accession to NATO, while serious doubts were aroused in the United States about extending the North Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Mull admitted that this topic was intensively discussed in the United States. One side argued that NATO was no longer needed, the other one warned that the dissolution of NATO might destabilize some states in Central and Eastern Europe. Weakening of the region might have led to a threat to international security in the future. An important part in convincing American politicians and society was played not only by Polish diplomats but also by the Polish-American community (*Polonia*). Mr. Ashe also pointed out that US support for NATO enlargement was still not certain in 1993. Though it was opposed by only a few, there were serious concerns about Russia's reaction. In this context, Polish Ambassador Jerzy Koźmiński played a major role. Knowing that politics is primarily local, he lobbied also outside Washington. This process took several years but ended in success. For Mr. Kozłowski, Poland's accession to NATO was one of the greatest successes of Polish diplomacy. In his opinion, the process was not only about the military and procedures, but also about a new way of thinking. In the context of the Polish lobbying campaign, he emphasized how important it was to gain allies in this matter. Convincing US decision-makers and ordinary people was far more effective than propaganda, because compatriots are trusted far more.

The moderator's last question was about contemporary Polish-American relations and their future. The panelists recalled Richard Holbrooke, who said that the United States is a European power. In this sense, US commitment to Europe's security derives from a feeling of a community of values and interests. According to Mr. Stawiski, this is being questioned today, and it is a joint challenge to adapt this common core to today's circumstances. Mr. Mull observed that every success brings with it some risks. Today, Americans are tired of their global responsibilities, though he remains optimistic. He justified his optimism with the strong commitment of Polish and US societies to the values of freedom and democracy. Mr. Kozłowski approached this question differently, as he pointed out the competition between two concepts of US relations with the outside world. One is "America first," representing the isolationist tradition, while the other one is the Wilsonian tradition, described as realistic idealism. It argues that the United States can be free and safe only when the entire world is free. After WW2, this policy was discontinued, but it lived on in the idea of a "Europe whole and free." Addressing the big number of young people present at the debate, Mr. Ashe remarked that freedom and democracy depend on the engagement of people. He expressed his hope that young people will be socially active as much as possible, regardless of their political preferences.

In the last part of the debate, the moderator presented questions from the audience. The first one concerned threats to Poland-US bilateral relations. According to Mr. Reiter, we have to remember that there are no good national solutions to complex problems. He warned that pursuing a path of anti-European, anti-German and anti-French sentiments leads straight to anti-American sentiments. In Mr. Reiter's opinion, Poland can be successful only within a successful EU, and the same goes for EU-US relations. Mr. Mull agreed that international cooperation needs to be deepened, because there is no single national solution. He was seconded by Mr. Kozłowski who argued that, in a more and more dangerous world, renationalization would take us right back to the nineteenth century. Only strong transatlantic ties can help different countries in facing today's challenges. Mr. Ashe stated that individual problems do not have to threaten the whole of a relationship. Asked by the former Polish Defense Minister, Bogdan Klich, about the emergence of a new security system after Crimea's occupation by Russia in 2014, the former ambassadors agreed that the current system has been merely modified. The American panelists especially stressed the US's commitment to NATO.

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Perceptions of China's Role in the MENA Region, The 5th China and the Middle East and North Africa Conference, Shanghai, 17–18 May, 2019

China's foreign policy is an issue of interest to researchers representing various disciplines, including political and security sciences, international studies, law as well as journalism and communication. Therefore, it is not surprising that a number of scientific conferences devoted to Beijing's relations with individual geopolitical regions and actors on the international arena is constantly growing. Most of them focus on both China's relations with the United States, Russia, or the European Union, and strategic conflicts, e.g. in the South China Sea. By contrast, there are also events that aim to explore new directions in China's foreign policy. The 5th China and the Middle East and North Africa Conference organized on May 17–18, 2019, at Shanghai University (SHU), can serve as an example of an interdisciplinary event related to Beijing's role in one of the key regions for the world's stability: MENA.

This year's edition of the Conference was organized by the units of Shanghai University: Institute of Global Studies, Center for Turkish Studies and College of Liberal Arts. The formula for selecting a host of the event is based on multi-institutional collaboration. Previous editions were hosted by Peking University (March 17–18, 2015), Qatar University (March 23–24, 2016), Shanghai University (June 7–8, 2017), Nevsehir Haci Bektas Veli University and Cappadocia University (June 20–22, 2018) (*Call for papers*) respectively. Conscious of the growing role of the Middle East and North Africa in China's foreign policy agenda, organizers of the Conference welcomed submissions related to numerous issues, both general and specific, including political economy of the Middle East, nationalism and nation-state, political parties, environment, social movements, religion and politics, gender, energy, trade, economic integration, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, modern Middle East and modern China, China's foreign policy toward Middle East/West Asia, and the Belt and Road Initiative (*Call for papers*). The main organizers of the Conference, Dr. Tugrul Keskin (Director of Center for Global Governance, SHU) and Dr. Yang Chen (Director of Center for Turkish Studies, SHU), were supported by the Organizing Committee consisting of respected scholars representing academic institutions from Canada, China, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, Turkey, and the United States (*Call for papers*).

Held in the New Le Hu Hotel (Baoshan Campus, Shanghai University), the Conference was officially opened by Dr. Tugrul Keskin. During the inaugural panel moderated by Prof. Guo Changgang (Shanghai University), the welcome speech was delivered by Prof. Yang Guang from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It was followed by the keynote speech dedicated to the foreign policy of Donald Trump's administration towards the MENA region presented by Prof. Juan Cole from the University of Michigan, former President of the Middle East Studies Association of North America.

The first day of the Conference proceedings consisted of six panels and was divided into three parallel panel sessions. Before lunch the listeners could enjoy papers related to the perceptions of China's soft power in the UAE, China's projections in North Africa, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from the perspective of the theory of international relations, and Syrian men's disability in the context of displacement in Jordan (panel 2). By

contrast, panel 3 encompassed speeches devoted to Turkey and the Gulf in terms of the political-economic challenges of an unstable region, the role of Saudi Arabia in relations between Saudi Arabia and China, female religious activity, and BRI in expanding Beijing's ties with West Asia and North Africa. Some of the most interesting papers from the following panels included: "The 'Quandary of Made in China': Palestinian Globalisation from Below Under Occupation," "The Triple Pillar of Sino-Middle East Relations in the Age of Neoliberalism" (panel 4), "Trend of Turkish economic policy and the Sino-Turkish Economic Cooperation under the Presidential System", "China's 'Enmeshment' and the Middle East – a Theoretical Approach" (panel 5), "An analysis of China's Middle East Smart Power Strategy," "The Role of Infrastructure in the Middle East Economic Development and the Prospects of 'One Belt One Road'" (panel 6), "A Living Archive? Reflections on an Oral History Project with Palestinian Bedouin Women in the Naqab," and "China's Relations with Lebanon and Syria: a Comparative Analysis" (panel 7). Papers scheduled on the first day of proceedings were delivered by scholars representing universities with well-established traditions in the field in question, namely Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Hamad bin Khalifa University, Harvard University, London School of Economics and Political Science, Middle East Technical University, Shanghai University, Texas Christian University, the University of Alberta, the University of California Santa Barbara, the University of Kassel, and the University of Sharjah.

The second day of the Conference consisted of nine panels. All of the presented papers were based on strong methodological foundations and reflected long-term research interests of the speakers. The ones that – according to the subjective opinion of the Author based on engagement and the questions provoked by the presentation – deserve recognition, were as follows:

- panel 8: "Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East: Opportunities and Challenges of Turkey in the Spiral of Power. Interests and Values," "Israel's Challenge of Stability in the Context of BRI's East Mediterranean Policies";
- panel 9: "China's Involvement in the Syrian Crisis: an Analysis of Beijing's UN Diplomacy," "Chinese Provinces as Foreign Policy Actors in the Middle East";
- panel 10: "Displacement of Global Power Balance: the China-USA-Iran Triangle as a Test Case";
- panel 11: "The Cyprus Question and the AKP Government (2002–2008)";
- panel 12: "The Dubai Silk Road Strategy: China's Evolving Role in the UAE's Development Trajectory", "China and the Reconstruction of Syria," "China's Energy Security Policy: from Malacca Dilemma to BRI";
- panel 13: "The Belt and Road Initiative and West Asia: Significance of Turkey-Iran Alliance," "A Geopolitical-Economic Perspective into the BRICS' Rise in Africa";
- panel 14: "The Changing Relationship between China and Russia in the Middle East";
- panel 15: "Importance of Youth, Entrepreneurship and Innovation on the Road and Belt Initiative".

Polish academic institutions were represented by scholars from Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń and the University of Economics in Cracow, that is Dr. Magdalena Lewicka, Michał Dahl (panel 10, "Failed Strategy and Its Consequences: the Legacy of Barack Obama's Presidency in the Middle East") and Dr. Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach (panel 11, "Environmental Justice in Turkey: Conflicts and Responses") respectively. Similarly to the first day of the Conference, on May 18, all the papers were given by respected scholars affiliated with

worldwide institutions, e.g. the Danish Institute for International Studies, Fudan University, Sichuan University, the University of Haifa, the University of Macao, the University of Michigan, the University of Oxford, and the University of Pennsylvania.

There is no doubt that the idea of organising an event dedicated to issues related to China, Middle East and mutual relations between these subjects is worthy and requires support. It seems to be even more beneficial, taking into consideration the international background of the invited speakers representing a whole variety of disciplines and research approaches. The abovementioned idea, together with an excellent organisation (thanks to Dr. Keskin, Dr. Yang, and numerous volunteers), constitutes a unique project that deserves appreciation. Likewise in the case of the previous editions, after the 5th China and the Middle East and North Africa Conference, a monographic collective work will be published. Selected papers will be placed in a peer-reviewed journal *Sociology of Islam* edited quarterly by Brill (*Sociology of Islam*). After the success of this year's edition, the organisers are already planning another meeting scheduled tentatively in May 2020, at one of the Middle Eastern partnering institutions.

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