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DISCOURSE ON NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MOLDOVAN POLITICS AFTER 2009

The issue of a common national identity for the people of the Republic of Moldova has been a problem since the beginning of this states independence, as well as in years directly before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Transnistrian War. Throughout the 20 years of independence, different concepts of a Moldovan nation have competed in public, scientific, and political discourse. A turning point came in 2009, when the ruling Communist Party of Moldova (PCRM) was replaced by a pro-European coalition of self-styled liberal-democratic parties who brought about a significant pluralisation of Moldovan public life. The goal of this article is to show how the discourse on national identity has changed in Moldovan politics since 2009, what concepts individual political forces advocate and how they have been received by the general public. Such an analysis will make it possible to predict if issues regarding national identity will remain key points in political elections in the near future.

To consider that differences in national identity were one of the main reasons for the Transnistrian War and the disintegration of the state in the early nineties is no overstatement. The spontaneously appearing Moldovan-Romanian national identity came into conflict with the strongly established Soviet identity of the Russian-speaking population (including ethnic Moldovans) who, mobilized by the economic elite, began a separatist movement on the left bank of the Dniester River.¹ But even then, as apparent from the sentence above, there was no unity and agreement as to the definition of the character of Moldavian national identity. From a historical perspective we can say that during the collapse of the Soviet Union the Moldavian national movement was composed of two factions with opposing views of what Moldovan identity is, the pan-Romanists and the Moldovanists.² The dispute between the proponents of these differing views has been at the center point of discussion regarding Moldovan national identity for the last twenty years.

¹ About identity aspect of Transnistrian Conflict you can read: S. Troebst, *The Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic: From Conflict-Driven State Building to State-Driven Nation Building*, "European Yearbook of Minority Issues" 2002/2003; and S. J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds. The symbolic politics of ethnic war*, Ithaca 2001.

² К. Нойкирх, *Республика Молдова между унионизмом, молдаванизмом и национализмом раждан государства*, in: *Национализм в поздние – и посткоммунистической Европе*, Moscow 2010, pp. 155–181; and Д. Фурман, *Молдавские молдаване и молдавские румыны. Влияние особенностей национального сознания молдаван на политическое развитие Республики Молдова*, <http://www.intelros.ru> (7.11.2011).

Pan-Romanism is an example of a primordial view of a nation. This is the way that the belief in the eternal existence of nations should be understood, in which belonging to a nation does not depend on personal identity or will, but can only be inherited by blood.³ Pan-Romanists do not recognize the existence of a Moldovan nation, and consider it simply a product of Soviet propaganda. In their view, Moldovans are part of a great Romanian nation, descendants of the Dacian people. Imperial Russian and Soviet rule of Bessarabia is seen as a time of occupation, and so the goal of pan-Romanists on both sides of the Prut River is to bring about a joining of the “two Romanian nations”, bringing to fruition the idea of Romania Mare – Great Romania.⁴

Moldovanism is a less homogeneous idea, and can be broken down into three basic subtypes – Eastern (also called Soviet), Ethnic and Civil. They all agree core on the idea of Moldavia as an independent nation, they do, however, differ on the issue of its character or genesis. The first variant, Eastern Moldovanism, emphasizes the connection Moldova has to Eastern-Slavic culture. According to this view, because the Moldovans developed with a background in the Russian Orthodox Church and thanks to contact with, first, Kievan and, next, Tsarist Russia and although the Moldovan tongue belongs to the Romance group of languages it should nevertheless be written in Cyrillic. This type of Moldovanism has not played a major political role in the independent Moldova, so we will not expand on this topic any further. It is, however, worth noting that it originated and continues as a Transnistrian state ideology.⁵

Ethnic and Civil Moldovanism have been used interchangeably in Moldovan political discussions, but it is worth differentiating between these two different ideas. The first type emphasizes the fact that the Moldovan nation exists since the Middle Ages, but whose independence Turkey, Russia and Romania have often interrupted. Stefan the Great, who was responsible for the prosperity of Moldova in the Middle Ages, is often presented as the father of the nation, and is lauded in this ideology. Here, the similarities between the Romanian and Moldovan cultures are not denied but their differences are stressed, for example, the Orthodox faith, stemming from the Russian and not Romanian Church, is also very important to this type of Moldovanism. The issue of language is also undeniably important for Ethnic Moldovanists, who maintain that it is significantly different from the Romanian tongue. Moldova’s historical relationship with Russia in this ideology is presented ambivalently: on one hand, Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union are presented as a foreign occupying force, but, at the same time, the increase in the standard of living as well as the flourishing of culture is highlighted.⁶ The time of Vladimir Voronin’s (who is discussed in more detail below) governing is especially significant for this ideology, during which elements of political and civil national identity were incorporated into it. This evolution was in all likelihood brought

³ A. D. Smith, *Nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 73–79.

⁴ J. Derlicki, *Czyje państwo i czyj nacjonalizm? Dylematy tożsamości w Mołdawii*, “Etnografia Polska”, Vol. 1–2, Warszawa 2007, pp. 11–13.

⁵ S. Troebst, “*We are Transnistrians!*” *The Post-Soviet Identity Menagment in Dniestr Valley*, <http://dacoromania.org/en/articles> (2.03.2011). Transnistrian national ideology was presented i.a. in the works of Nikolai Babilunga, *Феномен Приднестровья*, Tiraspol 2003.

⁶ J. Derlicki, *Czyje państwo i czyj nacjonalizm? Dylematy tożsamości w Mołdawii*, op. cit., pp. 11–13.

upon by political factors, as president Voronin could not follow an ideology that would exclude Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, or Gagauz living in Moldova who were not so willing to let go of their ethnic identities, and who also constituted the core of his electorate.

Civil (state) Moldovanism emphasizes the relationship between the citizens and the young nation. It attempts to call on a modern political patriotism, which does not differentiate between different ethnic backgrounds. In this way, anyone who feels Moldovan and believes in an independent Moldova is, in fact, Moldovan. This understanding of Moldovanism is an example of state, or political, national identity. The term “state (or political) nation” should be interpreted as a community that perceives itself as an outcome of its own political will and not simply the “result of organic growth”.⁷ A political collective which demands sovereignty but without appealing to any ethnic ties.⁸

During the collapse of the Soviet Union public discussion was dominated by Pan-Romanism, but this changed soon after Moldova gained independence. In the early nineties, Pan-Romanists and Moldovanists in Moldovan politics could be defined as romantic nationalists, and political pragmatists, respectively. The leader of the Popular Front of Moldova as well as the premier of Socialist Republic of Moldavia, Mircea Druc were Pan-Romanists, and the later president Mircea Snegur a Moldovanist. And so, for Druc and his immediate surroundings, a dominant goal for his administration was the unification with Romania and progressive Romanization of the Moldovan people. The Popular Front of Moldova, with Druc at its helm, made significant progress in this direction – Romanian was adopted as the official language of Moldova, and a flag identical to the Romanian flown as the country’s own. Snegur, as befitting a political pragmatist, threw his weight behind Moldovanism, on the logic that it is better to be the president of an independent Moldova rather than simply another Romanian politician.⁹ He was of course well aware of the political atmosphere in the country and the restrictions placed on him by the international community. As it turned out, most citizens supported Moldovan independence, which a majority voted for during the 1994 referendum.¹⁰ The radical ideals of the Popular Front of Moldova were good during the battle for independence, during which public discussion was dominated by Pan-Romanism, even though in 1992 only 10–12% of the population supported the unification with Romania.¹¹ After the Transnistrian War and once independence became a reality the “silent majority”,¹² as used by Neukirch to describe that part of the population that favored the more moderate goals of Moldovanism, started to voice its opinion and become more ac-

⁷ M. Canovan, *Lud*, Warszawa 2008, p. 65.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ К. Нойкирх, *Республика Молдова между унионизмом, молдаванизмом и национализмом раждан государства*, op. cit., pp. 162–163. But we have to remember that Snegur all the time used the slogan “One nation – two states”. See: *ibidem*, p. 170.

¹⁰ Moreover parliamentary elections in february 1994 are considered as the end of the era of popularity of Unionist idea. Unionists received only 7,53 of votes. See: К. Нойкирх, *Республика Молдова между унионизмом, молдаванизмом и национализмом раждан государства*, op. cit., p. 171.

¹¹ К. Нойкирх, *Республика Молдова между унионизмом, молдаванизмом и национализмом раждан государства*, op. cit., p. 170.

¹² *Ibidem*.

tive on the political scene. During Snegur's presidency, a divided right, showcasing a multitude of political beliefs ranging from extreme Pan-Romanism to Moldovanism, dominated the political scene. The pro-Russian movement *Edinstvo*¹³ was also consistently backed by a significant part of the population. Starting in 1996, and continuing to 2001, the issue of national identity received less attention, which corresponded with the presidency of Petru Lucinschi who represented agrarian circles,¹⁴ and far-ranging political divisions in the parliament. This period is characterized by constantly changing governments and coalitions, the president even lost the backing of his own political circle, which, taken all together, completely crushed any talks of a common national ideology. It is also worth noting that during this time, coalitions often formed beyond normal ideological boundaries, with political alliances between even the right and communists.¹⁵

The presidency of Vladimir Voronin and the PCRM government (2001–2009) is a time of intense national politics and development of the Moldovanistic idea. In *History of Moldova*, written in 2003 by Vasilie Stati, the author portrays the history of the state from the eleventh century until modern times.¹⁶ Historical policy was also used to legitimize current actions. For example, the Transnistrian War was presented as a secret operation by Romanian authorities whose goal was the absorption of Moldovaa, which was used to discredit Voronin's predecessors and explain the tense relations between the two countries. Five pillars supported Voronin's Moldovanism:

- Moldovan language – highlighting differences between Moldovan and Romanian tongues, and guarding its “purity”;
- The cult of Stefan the Great as the father of the nation. A documentary film was shot which shows Voronin pilgrimage to places associated with Stefan the Great to show the depth of Moldovan roots as well as to point out that Moldovaa is truly a European nation which protected the rest of Europe from the Turkish armies;
- Europeanism – emphasizing Moldova's European history, in which it provided a bridge between the East and West, which allowed Voronin to balance his politics between Russia and the European Union, and, depending on what the situation demanded, playing up Moldova's relationship with either the East or West;
- Eastern Orthodoxy – Voronin often made public appearances with the metropolitan of Chisinau, Vladimir, and every year, before Easter made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem to bring back the holy fire or went to meditate on Athos Mountain. It is worth noticing that resting the national idea on Eastern Orthodoxy has an exceptional sense in Moldavia, since it is the common faith of all the nationalities living there;

¹³ Д. Фурман, *Молдавские молдаване*, op. cit., p. 296.

¹⁴ “Agrarians” was politicians originated from Moldovan Communist Party representing agriculture industry circles. In the early 90's agrarians were the most important party on the center of the political spectrum.

¹⁵ J. Solak, *Moldawia. Republika na trzy pęknięta. Historyczno-społeczny, militarny i geopolityczny wymiar “zamrożonego konfliktu” o Naddniestrze*, Toruń 2009, pp. 28–38. K. Neukirch notice that after parliamentary elections in 1994 the issue of ethnicity and language was no more the most significant issue in Moldovan politics, К. Нойкирх, *Республика Молдова между унионизмом, молдаванизмом и национализмом раждан государства*, op. cit., p. 176.

¹⁶ В. Стати, *История Молдовы*, Chisinau 2003.

– A sense of attachment to the nation – here Ethic and Civic Moldovanism joined, which, as mentioned before, allowed all ethnic groups to join in the common national narrative.

The spring and summer of 2009 brought with them major changes in both the political scene and public life. The Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) lost not only the majority in parliament and the presidency, but also their control over the subject matter of national discourse. Between 2001 and 2009 PCRM took over most public media, but, after the spring of 2009, significant growth in the public media sector caused many new private television stations to come into existence, which considerably lessened PCRM monopoly on national focus, as TV is among the most influential public media in the country, as newspaper market in Moldova is very poor. The pluralisation of public discourse, however, did not simply boil down to it dividing between the new government and the current opposition (meaning PCRM), and the lack of a common standpoint for the ruling coalition is an important element of the Moldovan political scene. And so, since 2009, public discussion has been characterized by a polyphony of national identity issues.

The elections in July of 2009 were followed by the formation of the Alliance for European Integration, formed by four parties: the Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the “Our Moldavia” Alliance. From the coalitions very beginning it was clear that only the declared pro-European and anti-communist stance was common to all partners. Since the coalitions formation it has been an electrifying entity, also as a political idea.

The Liberal Party, led by Mihai Ghimpu, largely stems from the Popular Front of Moldova and, from today’s perspective, can be viewed as supporting Pan-Romanianism. An important aspect of Moldovan politics is that, currently, no main political party can allow itself to question the sense and lawfulness of an independent Moldova. However, Michai Ghimpu very clearly stresses his pro-Romanian (in fact, he even refers to himself as Romanian) and anti-Russian stance. Many Moldovans thought it scandalous when one of the leaders of the Liberal Party, mayor of Chisineu Dorin Chritoaca (the son of Ghimpu’s sister) presented the Romania president with a box filled with Moldovan soil. Ghimpu found many opportunities to publicly present his beliefs when as leader of parliament he became the acting president of the Republic of Moldova (July 2009–December 2010). Among his most controversial decisions are, for example: establishing June 28th, Soviet Occupation Day, as a national holiday (a decision ultimately overturned by the Constitutional Court); or erecting an obelisk in memory of victims of the Soviet regime before the seat of the government. Such actions led to a marked worsening of the Moldovan-Russian relationship. Often, M. Ghimpu’s actions are view as near political folklore, and many of his declarations end up in annals on the border of politics and comedy, among which belong his claim that he is able to distinguish Romanian land as soon as he looks at it (which was in support of the Romanian origins of Bessarabia). Nevertheless, this politician plays, and will, in all likelihood, continue to play a consequential role in Moldovan politics.

The Democratic Party, led by Marian Lupu, presents a more conservative standpoint on national identity. It is possible to say that they follow a civil/state Moldovanism. Lupu tries to not take a stand on historical issues, and attempts to strike a balance be-

tween pro-European and pro-Russian views. As a former member of PCRM, he has the largest backing of Russian-speaking populations among the coalition leaders. It is worth noticing that, out of all the leaders, he is also the one most often making his public statements in Russian. Lupu would like to be viewed by ethnic Russians or Gagauz as a guarantee of positive relations with Russia.

The smallest of the coalition parties, the “Our Moldavia” Alliance, led by Serafim Urecheanu, also refrains from engaging in ideological disputes. Present in Moldovan politics since the nineties, Urecheanu often presents himself as a Moldavian statesman with little time for inconsequential debates. The “Our Moldova” Alliance presents a type of Civil Moldovanism, but the many focus of party politics is on social issues. The party failed to get into the parliament in the December 2010 elections and was absorbed by the Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova shortly after.

Prime minister Vlad Filat, the leader of the liberal-democrats, distinctly tries to build a modern civil/state national identity. When speaking about the inhabitants of Moldova, he tries to avoid using ethnic categories, and to refrain from using “Moldovans” uses “citizens of Moldova” instead. He finds any mention of Russian or Ukrainians living in Moldova, obviously irritating and stresses that, first and foremost, they are all citizens of Moldavia. When asked if these citizens form a uniform nation he answers: “Moldova is an independent state with a uniform and sovereign people”. Filat clearly ties his beliefs to a political nation, according to which ethnicity is a private matter, just like religion or sexual orientation. This author has been witness to an interesting exchange between Prime Minister Filat and his press advisor. When the latter suggested the phrase “multiethnic nation” to the prime minister, the irritated Filat responded with “No! In your understanding it may be multiethnic, but we do not use these categories”. After the interview was over he joked with his advisor “I hope you choke on that multiethnic nonsense!” knowing full well he was saying it in the presence of reporters (and he also said it in Russian, understood by this author, and not Romanian, which would have “coded” the message). A certain *novum* in Moldavian public life is Filat’s stance on the issue of language. For years the discussion on whether Moldovan is separate from Romanian had been politicized and understood as a discussion on whether Moldovas are a separate nation. The prime minister emphasizes that he speaks Romanian, not Moldovan, which does not make him any less of a patriot: “I am a Moldovan who speaks Romanian, just as Americans speak English”.¹⁷ Internationally and geopolitically Filat is, without doubt, pro-West, but he is not doctrinally anti-Russian (unlike M. Ghimpu, for example). Despite that, many commentators believed that Filat would not be able to gain the support of the Russian-speaking population, which only served to strengthen the position of the PKRM. This has since changed, and the prime minister does at times use Russian publically, which is seen as an important gesture.

The Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, since their requalification as the opposition, has remained by its Moldovanist position and tried to consolidate their electorate by various means, ranging from threats of compulsory Romanization under the rule of the Alliance for European Integration, to openly pro-Russian gestures and ap-

¹⁷ All quotes are from the interview that author made with prime minister Filat on August 1, 2012. Interview was published in “Nowa Europa Wschodnia” 2010, No. 6.

pealing to Soviet sentiments. Presenting the entire Alliance as covert pan-Romanians is a constant element of in the Communist Party rhetoric. Already during the campaign before the 2009 elections PCRM released an ad in which Stefan the Great warned citizens: “There will be no independent Moldova under Filat’s rule, he serves only Romanian interests”. The day before the elections, *Neizavisimaia Moldova*, the Party’s press outlet, menaced its readers with stories of the coming Romanian armed groups, and portrayed every visit by the Romanian president Traian Basescu very negatively. President Michai Ghimpu, whose anti-Russian and anti-Soviet gestures, undoubtedly helped galvanize the pro-Russian sentiment. His statements were portrayed by communists as attacks on a common history, and attempts to divide society into first- and second-class citizens.

Three different national narrations can be distinguished in Moldovan politics since 2009: pro-Romanian, represented by the Michai Ghimpu’s Liberal Party; Civil/State Moldovanist, promoted by prime minister Filat, and his rival Marian Lupu; as well as Ethnic Moldovanist, represented by the Communist Party.¹⁸ An undeniable majority of Moldovans does not deny their Moldavian national identity; the choice here is between Ethnic and Civil variants. PCRM’s core electorate is formed, first and foremost, by the Russian-speaking population (who represent almost 30% of the citizens¹⁹), and older people who feel a sentiment towards past Soviet times. Moldovan analyst Igor Bocan also postulates that because of Moldova’s patriarchal culture, people from less urbanized areas are more likely to vote for a strong leader like Vladimir Voronin.²⁰ For a great majority of the Russian-speaking, as well as the less-educated country population, the “Romanian scare” tactic employed by Voronin is quite effective. The direct reference to Soviet symbolism in party propaganda also pulls in a part of the electorate. Another argument voiced by Voronin is that that it was the right that brought about the Transnistrian War, the memory of which is still quite strong in a portion of the population. Filat’s electorate is predominantly composed of more educated young people living in cities, who are pro-European and do not deny their Moldovan heritage. Igor Bocan also points out that a percentage of Voronin’s traditional electorate is also turning to support Filat, the new strong leader character archetype.²¹ Marian Lupu and his Democratic Party fill the gap between the liberal-democrats and communists and often receive the vote of Russian-speaking people who have become disillusioned with PCRM or have a more pro-European attitude. Someone unaware of the local contexts may not understand why Russian-speaking voters would support a party promoting Ethnic and not Civil Moldovaanism. However, it is a fact that Ethnic Moldovanism is, by its nature, much more pro-Russian and, as it has been mentioned, incorporates Soviet sentimentalism. Sensitive Russians or Gagauz, on the other hand, could perceive Filat’s views, as pro-Romanian. For them it is enough that the leader of the PLDM works to improve relations with Romania, and refers to his tongue as Romanian.

¹⁸ PCRM use sometimes some plotes of civil identity narration, but they are not so visible and important like in the case of Filat. Much more attention PCRM pay into the issue of history and language.

¹⁹ P. Kolsto, *Moldova and the Dniestr Republic*, in: *Conflicts in the OSCE area*, Oslo 1997, p. 1.

²⁰ From the interview with Igor Bocan made on of May 2, 2011 in Chisinau.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

These considerations beg the question: if most Moldovans do not question their Moldovan identity, why does the issue of a union with Romania return, time after time, with such force in public media, followed by manifestations by both proponents and opponents of the idea?

Sociologists estimate that the core electorate of the Liberal Party is around 9% (in the last elections they obtained 9.96%²²), however, with their current rhetoric and historical “baggage”, this party is able to amass more than 15% of the vote.²³ This core electorate, as well as potential Liberal Party voters, is made up of people who see themselves as Romanian and Moldovans who think close relations with this country are important, and also anti-Russian and anti-Soviet groups. Artists and scientists, who continue the romantic nationalism of the eighties and nineties, are numerous in this electorate.²⁴ The pro-Romanian population is undoubtedly one of the most engaged and politically active social groups. Marches in memory of the annexation of Bessarabia by Romania in 1918 often draw a considerable amount of supporters of a re-annexation. It is also assessable that Michai Ghimpu, aware of his political potential, is more concerned with solidifying his electorate rather than with trying to expand it. Many of his political gestures drawing critical reactions from Russia or the Communist Party are done exactly with this in mind and bring the desired results.²⁵ The Communist Part of the Republic of Moldova, as mentioned earlier, also plays the “Romanian card”. They use slogans that threaten Romanization under right-wing rule, or the division of society in to better and worse citizens (recalling postulates of the Popular Front of Moldova from the end of the eighties), to mobilize their electorate, which also represents a quite active part of society. In effect, every pro-Romanian manifestation is met with an anti-Romanian one. A considerable part of Moldovan analysts are of the opinion that an annexation of Moldova by Romania is not, and perhaps never was, a possibility. However, because of the political escalation of the issue, it still appears a viable problem. What is important is that in serious discussions there is no longer talk of a merging of the two countries, but rather a focus on the history and relations of Moldova with Romania and Russia.

Newspapers and journalists were swept up in a discussion summing up the twenty years of the existence of the country in the second half of August 2011. The greatest achievement of those years was considered the fact that something which twenty years ago was called “project Moldova” is now a sovereign country, whose sense and legitimacy of existence is not called into question. No one in mainstream discourse also questions the fact that besides an independent Moldova there is also a Moldovan nation.

²² *Liberal Party – Statistics*, Association for Participatory Democracy, <http://www.e-democracy.md/ru/elections/parliamentary/2010/results/> (16.10.2011).

²³ Liberal Party has a good result in the elections on 5.04.2009 – they received 13,35% of votes, <http://www.e-democracy.md/ru/elections/parliamentary/2009/results/> (16.10.2011).

²⁴ Pan-Romanian ideology is still alive among Moldovan scientists, especially historians. More: S. D. Roper, *The politicization of education: Identity formation in Moldova and Transnistria*, “Comunist and Post-Comunist Studies” 2005, No. 38, pp. 501–514; and N. Sinaeva-Pankowska, *Moldawskie multikulti*, “Nowa Europa Wschodnia” 2009, No. 3–4.

²⁵ Author does not try to insinuate that Mihai Ghimpu is cynically using part of the society to his political games. Ghimpus actions suggest that he actually believes in voiced views.

Many young people from the generation that grew up after the collapse of the Soviet Union proudly proclaim the fact that they are Moldovan (which is often combined with a slight disdain for Romanians). However, the discussion about the character of the Moldovan nation, its relationship with the past and its neighbors continues. Issues of identity remain one of the most important determinants of political identification. The loss by PCRM of its monopoly over the control of public discourse and the rivalry between the largest political parties have once again revived discussion on that topic, perhaps excessively so. Progressively larger social groups seem to support the state identity narrative promoted by Filat, as evidenced even by the growing popularity of his party.²⁶ The movement of voters from the pro-Romania Liberal Party to the Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova, or even between the liberal-democrats and the Communist Party shows that, for Moldovan society, the issue of national identity is gradually losing significance in political elections.

ABSTRACT

Throughout the 20 years of independence, different concepts of a Moldovan nation have competed in public, scientific, and political discourse. A turning point came in 2009, when the ruling Communist Party of Moldova was replaced by a pro-European coalition of self-styled liberal-democratic parties who brought about a significant pluralisation of Moldovan public life. The goal of this article is to analyse the discourse on national identity in Moldovan politics since 2009.

DYSKURS TOŻSAMOŚCIOWY W MOŁDAWSKIEJ POLITYCE PO ROKU 2009

STRESZCZENIE

W ciągu dwudziestu lat niepodległości w publicznej, naukowej i politycznej dyskusji dało się zauważyć rozmaite koncepcje odnoszące się do idei narodu mołdawskiego. Punktem zwrotnym stało się zwycięstwo pro-europejskiej koalicji partii liberalno-demokratycznych w 2009 r., co doprowadziło do pluralizacji życia publicznego w Mołdawii. Celem artykułu jest analiza dyskursu tożsamościowego w mołdawskiej polityce po 2009 r.

²⁶ PLDM received 12,43% of votes in April 2009 and 29,42% in November 2010, <http://www.algeri.md> (8.11.2011).

