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Countering Terrorism at the Onset of the 21st Century – Through Chaos to the New World Order

The threat posed by terrorism constitutes nowadays – at the the onset of the 21st century – one of the most formidable challenges to international security.[1] The nature and scope of the menace bears testimony to the existence of two trends: the globalization of this phenomenon on the one hand and the esclalation of terrorist activity on the other. The first of these tendencies means that terrorists may aim at any target in any country of their choice, whereas the other one indicates certain parts of the world such as the Middle East and Iraq in particular, which have seen the attacks of unprecedented extent and intensity. The September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. mark a specific turning point in the approach to the issue of countering the terrorist threat. That is not to say, however, that the transnational problem of terrorism surfaced out of the blue upon the emergence of al-Qaeda. Paul R. Pillar offers a fairly accurate evaluation of the issue arguing that the world has come up against "old problem in a new era."[2] In the main, Pillar relates the figures for the 1980s to those of the 1990s and points out to nearly 5500 acts of international terrorism for the former period with nearly 4000 terror actions for the latter span. It is fair to claim, however, that the threat of international terrorism has been present for at least three decades and is closely connected with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that remains unresolved until this day.

Three decades ago, with the Cold War in full swing, the extent and nature of this threat seemed slightly different. The terrorists of that day were primarily driven by the radical left-wing ideology.[3] The post-Cold War era sees, in turn, the prominence given to the aura of extremist rendition of reli-

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[1] See among others, P. G. Cerny, *Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma*, "Naval War College Review," vol. 58, no. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 11–33.

[2] P. R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U. S. Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C. 2003, p. 41.

[3] The claim is exemplified by such organizations as RAF, Red Brigade, CCC and Action Directe.

gious phrases fomented by *stricte* political objectives. To be able to answer the question of fundamental relevance – i.e. is it feasible to neutralize the threat to international order posed by modern terrorism? – first and foremost, one needs to conduct an in-depth study of the nature and evolution of the threat itself as well as the scope and effectiveness of the action taken by the Western countries aimed at countering it.

Despite its apparent simplicity, the question of who the West is at war with within the framework of its war against terrorism, seems quite just as puzzling as the definition of terrorism itself. One of al-Qaeda's leaders, Osama bin Laden, claims not to be a terrorist, just as the majority of other terrorists do. If, however, Boaz Ganor's definition of terrorism as "the deliberate use of violence against civilians in order to achieve political gain"[4] is to be considered valid, then both the operations of al-Qaeda and of the other organizations adopting parallel tactics aimed at similar objectives may be regarded as terrorist. Among the answers to the first of the above-mentioned questions, the most commonly voiced one indicates that the ongoing struggle is being waged between the Western world represented by the USA and extremist militants tied to radical Islamic groups.[5] With reference to Martin van Creveld's terminology, the current fight against terrorism is shaping up as an asymmetric conflict, with the Western nations and states being pitted against sub-national groups forming a vague network structure.[6] Although the conflict originates from the Cold War era, a large number of historians and Arabists rightly argue that the roots of the struggle involving the two sides date back to the beginning of the Middle Ages, particularly the crusades.[7] Moreover, the period of the Western colonial domination, in the Middle East in particular, resulted in the perpetuation of stereotypes readily invoked by present-day fundamentalists. One of the no-

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[4] B. Ganor, *Lessons from the Counter-terrorism War*, MEF Wires, April 8, 2005, http://www.meforum.org/article/710.

[5] See among others, J. Schanzer, *At War With Whom? A Short History of Radical Islam*, Doublethink, Spring 2002.

[6] M. Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, The Free Press, New York 1991, p. 225; see also: D. Tucker, *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism*, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut 1997; and *Terrorism in the 21st Century*, in: *Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World*, Report by the National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism, National War College, May 2002, pp. 9–14.

[7] Cf. D. C. Rapaport, *Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,* in: *Terrorism in Perspective*, P. Griset and S. Mahan (ed.), SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks–London–New Delhi 2003, pp. 20–24; see also: J. Hauziński, *Muzułmańska sekta asasynów w europejskim piśmiennictwie wieków średnich*, Poznań 1978, pp. 12–14 and S. Runciman, *Dzieje wypraw krzyżowych*, Warszawa 1997, vol. 2, pp. 114–115, vol. 3, p. 71 and R. Mahajan, *New Crusade: The U.S. War on Terrorism*, "Monthly Review," vol. 53, no. 9, February 2002, http://www.monthlyreview.org/0202mahajan.htm.

table features that helps distinguish between the Cold War years and the post-Cold War era is the process of intense internationalization of terrorism as well as the proliferation of terrorist threats onto virtually all Western countries – both manifesting themselves in the post-Cold War timespan.

The biggest threat to peace that the West faces today is posed by religious extremists. It is worth pondering, at this point, how the West and the USA in particular came to be the principal enemy of Muslim fundamentalists. According to R. Scott Appleby, the emergence of islamic terrorism in the 20th century is a reaction against the oppression of Muslims in the Middle East brought by the influence of imported ideologies (Marxism and capitalism) and, in the broader sense, by the shift in cultural values (the advancement of globalization) and in lifestyle (Americanization, Westernization), all of which stand in bitter opposition to Islamic traditions.[8] To put it another way, radical Islam is a response to social, economic and moral crises of today. The aforementioned question needs to be expanded upon, though.

As far as historical aspects are concerned, according to David C. Rapoport, religion was the driving force behind the use of violence in terror action until the middle of the 19th century as exemplified by the activity of Zealots, Sicarii and Thugs.[9] Owing to the emergence of radical left-wing ideologies, the religious sanction for terror came to be waning for at least 100 years, though it never vanished altogether. In Bruce Hoffman's view, that was the case due to the political situation in specific European countries – the decline of monarchic regimes and the growing popularity of the concepts of self-determination and national independence.[10] The turn to secularized policies reinforced the effort of anticolonial and national liberation movements, which reached its zenith during the first two post-World War II decades. The page was turned, though, with religious extremists assuming power in Iran. They started to support and establish fundamentalist terror organizations with a view to propagating religious ideology.[11] Their operational range is no longer confined to the Middle East as it was the case during the Cold War. The surge in anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in the states of that region, triggered by the permanent deployment of the U.S. military forces there ever since the Gulf War, effected the religion-driven internationalization of the terrorist threat.[12]

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[8] R. S. Appleby, *Korzenie terroryzmu fundamentalistycznego*, in: *Encyklopedia terroryzmu*, Warszawa 2004, p. 378.

[9] See: D. C. Rapoport, op. cit., p. 28.

[10] B. Hoffman, *Oblicza terroryzmu*, Warszawa 1999, pp. 85–86.

[11] S. M. Ranstorp, *Terrorism in the Name of Religion*, "Journal of International Affairs," vol. 50, no. 1, Summer 1996, pp. 43–45.

[12] Cf. H. Munson, *Lifting the Veil. Understanding the Roots of Islamic Militancy*, "Harvard International Review," vol. 25, no. 4, Winter 2004.

As regards the socio-behavioral and ideological issues, they can be expressed in the question of how religous faith affects the conduct of individuals as well as little communities. It is worth noting, at this point, that limiting oneself to the sole evaluation of terrorist activity by Islamic extremists would be tantamount to a spin as the scope of today's religion-driven terrorism encompasses all of the major denominations (Jewish, Muslim, Christian and Hindu). Each religious community is inclined to take any measures to defend its own system of beliefs, for this system constitutes both individual and collective identity.[13] Interestingly, terrorists of diverse socio-political background invoking the religious imperative have a lot in common. B. Hoffman notes that the terrorist of this breed considers resorting to violence to be a sacramental act that corresponds to the discharge of an obligation imposed upon him by divine command.[14] Religious terrorists make selective use of the Word revealed by God only referring to the lines that validate their present conduct. They aim, in this case, at claiming full rights to determine the world's fate, including the time and extent of using violence against infidels. B. Hoffman is wrong to contend, though, that terrorists do not seek the support of religious communities[15] as Islamic terrorists (al-Qaeda, Hezbollah) and their propaganda activity in particular is designed to unite the Muslim community for the struggle against Western influences. The study of terrorist activity on the part of religious extremists proves, however, that only Islamic terrorism poses a global threat presently, which has manifested itself in several attacks in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas over the past two decades. Terrorism is a direct, ideology-rooted reaction against the growing influence of the secularized West in the Muslim world. It is also an attempt at protecting Islam-based local ties, values and lifestyle from universalist processes such as globalization and Americanization. Last but not least, it is an attempt at defending the Muslim world as a whole and preserving it as it used to be not so long ago. In terms of the political philosophy, such reasoning is of purely reactionary and antimodernizing nature. Unfortunately, other fundamentalisms apply parallel esthetics and resort to violence as well. It is absolutely crucial, therefore, to trace the link between the above-mentioned reasons for using violence and other factors that impel modern terrorists to carry out the attacks (economic, psychological and social circumstances), though in the case of religious terrorists, it is the ideological motives that make up the

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[13] J. Fox, *Religion and Terrorism in the World System*, in: *Transnational Terrorism in the World System Perspective*, R. Stemplowski (ed.), Warszawa 2002, p. 99.

[14] B. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 90.

[15] Ibidem, p. 91.

driving force behind their terror action. In many cases it is simply impossible to clearly separate the religious objectives from the political ones. To prove that point only takes citing an excerpt from the al-Qaeda Declaration of War (World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders) of February 23, 1998, which gives the reasons for declaring war on the West:

> First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim Peoples.
> …Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance… the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres…
> Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into a paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.[16]

Unable to match the capabilities of their enemy, terrorists opt for the simplest solutions such as using plastic knives or handmade bombs, as was the case in the attacks on landmark sites in NYC, Washington, D.C. and London. Moreover, they do not aim at inflicting heavy casualties (the September 11 attacks being the odd one out), but rather instilling the utmost horror in the enemy, for the Western civilization – materialistic and nihilistic to the core – regards fear (the fear of sudden death in particular) as a taboo subject. It is the fear of sacrificing life ("the Vietnam syndrome") that was to urge the Americans to pull out of the Middle East, but in the end this presumption turned out way off the mark. The terrorists were mistaken in their premise that causing economic, political and ideological chaos throughout the Western world will pave the way for the new world order involving Islamic nations as one of the major players.

The terrorist activity and the gain in significance of the Islamic terrorists themselves clearly follow a shift in international relations of the mid-1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw the world thrown into geopolitical turmoil and nowhere was the void more evident than in the Middle East. The war in Afghanistan in the 1980s that ended in the Soviet defeat also led

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[16] Quote as in: N. Ferguson, *Colossus. The Price of Americas Empire*, The Penguin Press, New York 2004, p. 120.

to the emergence of a mighty network of well-trained Islamic militants,[17] who, under new geopolitical conditions, faced another enemy whose very existence has threatened the interests of the world of Islam.

According to Paul R. Pillar, the processes indirectly connected with the post-Cold War issues also made a considerable impact upon the enhancement of the terrorist threat.[18] The first process concerns the dissemination of access to high-end information technologies (IT). On the one hand, IT facilitates access to information regarding the technologies that might be used by terrorists (weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons). On the other hand, though, an expertly applied technology may become the weapon itself (cyberterrorism). The other process pertains to the advancement of globalization, particularly with reference to the free movement of persons. However, modern terrorists more and more often opt for the M.O. that guarantees them operational effectiveness and, at the same time, conserves their financial and logistic resources. Obviously, that tactic influences the way terrorism is combated as well as makes the struggle even more burdensome.

The post-Cold War struggle waged between Islamic terrorists and the USA – the world's only superpower – manifests several characteristic features. For one thing, none of the most menacing terrorist groups enjoys any support from any of America's principal rivals challenging for the world domination. It is fair to say, therefore, that this is the struggle on the fringes of the world taken up by the outsiders in defense of the *status quo*. Terror actions move the fringes over to the center of the metropolis, which in turn blurs the line between the metropolis and the outskirts. In order to preserve the line, semantic-wise at least, the Americans coined under the Clinton administration the term "rogue states." The phrase was attributed to the states that, according to the USA, supported terrorism during the Cold War and never discontinued doing so after it ended. Owing to an ideological overtone and political acuteness of this term, its use was swiftly terminated and replaced with a euphemistic phrase "states of concern."[19] That piece of semantic juggling by no means implied, according to the then U.S. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, the revision of the American policy towards those states, nor towards the terrorists backed by them, for the threat represented by the terrorists remained unchanged. What's more, the escalation of the sense of menace across the USA resulting from several at-

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[17] P. R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2003, pp. 46–47.
[18] Ibidem, pp. 47–48.
[19] See: Steven Mufson, *A 'Rogue' Is a 'Rogue' Is a 'State of Concern;' U.S. Alters Terminology for Certain Countries*, "The Washington Post," June 20, 2000, p. A16; *'Rogue states' no more, but a 'concern,'* United Press International, June 20, 2000.

tacks targeting American citizens overseas (Africa, Asia) as well as domestically (the 1993 WTC bomb attack) necessitated the switch in counter-terrorism strategy to a more offensive approach.

The action taken by the two sides in no way validates Samuel Huntington's and Bernard Lewis's thesis, showcased at the turn of the 20th century, about the clash of civilizations[20] as neither side operates in the name of or for the benefit of its own civilization, but rather in defense of its own vexed interest. It can be claimed, then, that it is a conflict setting premodernity against modernity. On then one hand, it is a clash driven by the fear of sudden changes severing long-standing ties. On the other hand, it is a clash motivated by the fear of losing clout in the world of Islam. The West does not make an enemy of the world of Islam itself, rather of an individual terrorist or specific terrorist groups that, despite seeking legitimization for their operations, do not represent anyone but themselves.[21] This fact makes an essential difference in relation to the Cold War era as presently the USA fights an all-out war against terrorists that operate globally and aim at causing international mayhem so as to undermine the U.S. economic and political superiority and to push America to revise its role in the world – as was previously the case with the Soviet Union.

For the action taken by the USA to produce an expected result it was essential to set new strategic and tactical objectives. Generally speaking, the strategic objective has come to mean the kind of international set-up that will promote the advancement of international and interpersonal interaction, which might contribute substantially to reducing the terrorist threat. The tactical objective includes successive steps taken by the military forces and intelligence services of the countries opposing terrorism designed to eliminate the current threat posed by the activity of terrorist cells worldwide. This philosophy seems to come forth in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as in somewhat less publicized activities of special services across Europe, Africa and Asia.

That the September 11 attacks have made a considerable impact upon the shift in the balance of power in international relations appears to be an oversimplified statement.[22] It can be argued in all likelihood, however, that

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[20] See: S. Huntington, *The Cash of Civilizations?*, "Foreign Affairs," vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22–49; B. Lewis, *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, "Atlantic Monthly," vol. 266, September 1990, pp. 47–60.

[21] See: J. Esposito, *Beyond the Headlines. Changing Perceptions of Islamic Movements*, "Harvard International Review," vol. 25, no. 2, Summer 2003, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1116/.

[22] Cf. D. C. Gompert, *An American Perspective*, in: *The War Against Terrorism and the Transformation of the World Order*, "ESF Working Paper," no. 5, December 2001, p. 16.

the post-September 11 period resulted in literal defining of the postions taken by all major players with reference to international terrorism. A given stance on the issue was implied by their taking proper measures to ensure international and national security.

The efficacy of counter-terrorism action within the framework of the war against terrorism that the West has been engaged in since the onset of the 21st century is undermined by discrepant vexed interests of the European countries and the USA in the world of Islam, with the war in Iraq epitomizing that. Politics clearly determined the selection of instruments that the anti-terror campaign participants intended to use, while the instruments themselves were precisely customized to achievable objectives.

One needs to notice, at this point, that an effective anti-terrorist operation requires involvement on at least four different levels. According to P. R. Pillar, these levels are as follows: eradicating the roots of terrorism, learning the intentions of terrorists, thwarting the oparations of terrorists as well as ensuring the security and defense capability to own citizens.[23]

The first segment seems to pose the most serious challenge as the roots of the terrorist threat of today go back a great many years. They also bear socio-political implications of the past and relate to ideological and psychological issues. The current counter-terrorism action involves the international set-up as a whole or some of its participants only and addresses the effects, rather than the causes of the current events. Unfortunately, this is where the war against terrorism manifests its most impotent side. There is no establishing a coherent strategy resisting such threats when taking into account more than one hundred terrorist organizations that operate in specific parts of the world (or globally) being driven by various motives and ideologies, represent a diverse level of threat and enjoy a diverse level of social legitimization with reference to the action taken by them. There are two reasons behind terrorism that gain prominence among those expressed today. The first premise concerns the issue of politics and ethnicity,[24] for terrorism serves as an instrument in the struggle for the right to self-determination (vide Kurdistan, the Basque Country, Palestine, Corsica). Even though terrorism seems ineffective and accepted to a little extent (Palestine, Kurdistan) or hardly accepted at all (the Basque Country, Corsica), it still is a menacing and naturally employed means of political struggle. The other reason behind terrorism concerns a wide range of social, economic and cultural problems. Considering the geographical range of terrorist threats – it needs to be updated daily in effect – most of today's terrorist organizations were estab-

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[23] Cf. P. R. Pillar, op. cit., pp. 18–40.
[24] Ibidem, pp. 30–32.

lished and have been operating in developing countries (usually in Muslim and Asian states – Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia). Some of these groups operate on a global basis (al-Qaeda). Terrorist organizations are mainly motivated by the growing disproportion of wealth domestically as well as worldwide. Accordingly, modern terrorism constitutes a side effect of globalization. Extreme poverty in Third World countries coupled with no chance of breaking free from penury make a breeding ground for the emergence of extremist social attitudes. Interestingly, a large portion of modern terrorists is made up of young, poorly-educated men of impoverished and multi-child background with social ties on the wane.[25] Taking into account the complexity of modern terrorism, enjoying the right to self-determination or a more equitable distribution of the fruits from globalizing international trade will not settle this issue, for today it is the resorting to terrorism combined with an extremist outlook that manifests the struggle for a righteous world order – with tyrants having no say and democratic values being compromised to make way for the elitism of radical ideologies.

Is it possible, therefore, considering the above factors, to devise an effective counter-terrorism strategy? It seems barely feasible for several underlying reasons.[26] First of all, the world order of today is based on the principles cementing the current *status quo* and the violation of these rules would cause chaos in all operational fields of the contemporary international system. Second of all, there is no will to cooperate on the political level (vide contention about the Iraq war) and the economic level (vide dispute over further trade liberalization stirred up at the WTO forum). The lack of the will only petrifies, according to minor players, an unjust system of trade, which spurs a more determined struggle for the benefit of the weakest nations. Last but not least, at present the Western countries do not have sufficient economic and military potential that could facilitate successful anti-terrorist operations. On the one hand, it is about increasing financial aid to the most heavily indebted developing countries and about having the capabilities to engage in multi-front warfare at the same time (even the Americans are not capable of that now, nor will they be in the nearest future).

The current war against terrorism also seeks to foil terrorist activity to the fullest extent possible. The activities within that scope are commonly thought of as special service and military operations targeting specific ter-

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25 Ibidem, p. 31.
26 Cf. C. Conetta, *Terrorism, World Order, and Cooperative Security*, Project on Defense Alternatives *Briefing Memo #24*, 9 September 2002, http://www.comw.org/pda/0209coop-sec.html.

rorist groups or individuals (vide tracking down bin Laden and al-Zarqawi), which is way off the mark. A successful counter-terrorism strategy should encompass a range of instruments such as diplomacy, law and international tribunals (incl. freezing terror funds[27]), military forces and intelligence services.[28] Unfortunately, even the most complex strategy cannot challenge the terrorists that use the most primitive tools and integrate into a given society. That is the case when cracking down on an intricate network of terrorist cells based in dozens of countries (al-Qaeda). With a view to enhancing the effectivenes of anti-terrorist action, it is essential, therefore, to only pursue the tactical objectives so as to eliminate the possibility of an atttack on selected landmarks of the metropolis.

At present, the efforts of all anti-terror campaigners do not seem to produce lasting results. That is even more stunning as the collaborative endeavors involve all major participants of international relations, including the world's most powerful organizations (the UN, NATO, the EU) as well as the most prominent state officials. The first serious objection that could be raised with reference to this cooperation is the striking disparity in the perception of its objectives stemming from dissimilar premises and vexed interests. The incoherence clearly surfaced in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks – faced with the looming terrorist threat and with the implications of the already mounted terrorist attacks, a great many countries chose to pull out of the anti-terror coalition (vide Spain after March 11, 2004). That kind of approach indicates the political impotence of these political entities, the reluctance to bear additional costs, to assume the risk of a resolute action. First and foremost however, it signifies the aversion to viewing the counter-terrorism operations strategy in another way.[29] Not surprisingly, then, a bulk of anti-terror action is only initiated as a consequence of devastating terrorist attacks, exemplified by the hardly effective "war on terror" declared *ex post* by the Americans at the onset of the 21st century. The U.S. reaction based on the conviction that al-Qaeda operates as the sole enemy in the war is a major stumbling block to a successful anti-terror operation. Despite its political significance, the initial international reaction, across Europe in particular, also proved insubstantial as there was no stern, follow-up anti-terror action.[30] It could not be any different, though, as there was no readily applicable joint strategy, nor a cooperation plan in place.

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[27] See: *Shutting Down Terrorist Financing, A briefing by D. Aufhauser*, "MEF Wires," December 11, 2003, http://www.meforum.org/article/588.
[28] See: P. R. Pillar, op. cit, pp. 73–129.
[29] Cf. M. Madej, *Międzynarodowy terroryzm polityczny*, Warszawa 2001, pp. 66–70.
[30] See: D. A. Lake, *Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century*, "Dialog-IO," Spring 2002, pp. 23–25.

Marek Madej is right to claim, therefore, that a reactive and inert attitude of the Western countries towards combating terrorism has scant preventive value and results in "delayed preventive action."[31] What's equally significant, as time mitigates the shock brought about by a terrorist attack and as some anti-terrorist operations fail, the public pressure in specific countries invariably frustrates any consistent anti-terror effort.

The post-Cold War years manifest a fair degree of instability, which is only right for the unipolar system. That lack of stability seems an inherent constituent of the time of struggle for the new world order. The pundit opinion goes as far as to say that the post-Cold War era came to an end upon the September 11 attacks, whereas the present day marks the time of the new world order emerging from the mayhem of a vicious struggle for the world domination.[32] It is hard to establish for certain, over such a short timespan, if and when the post-Cold War era came to a close, but the subsequent part of the above statement seems true. The international community of today is faced, after all, with the scope of threat never experienced before and with the threat of a completely different background than any of the previous ones.

With the balance of the global economic and political relations profoundly shaken, the far-reaching implications include a strong conviction fostered by Islamic extremists that the USA is a "colossus with weak knees"[33] that cannot be defeated in a head-on struggle, but can be intimidated by an act of violence targeting civilians or by the use of the "oil weapon." Obviously, the two forms of struggle are not equally effective. Interestingly, as indicated by the developments of the recent years, the colossus suffers most as oil prices increase and it is the very anti-terror campaign in the Middle East (particularly in Iraq) that has led to the price rise. That fact, in turn, has global consequences as the price rises of the world's most significant fossil fuel make a substantial, long-term impact upon economic growth. Any disruption in the supply of oil and the fuel's steep price in particular, are both detrimental to economic and political stability, which results in further chaos worldwide.

To conclude, the victory in the war against terrorism can never be final.[34] At best, the threat posed by terrorists can be reduced. P. R. Pilar seems right

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[31] Ibidem, p. 69.

[32] Cf. F. Heisbourg, *A European View*, in: *The War Against Terrorism*, op. cit., p. 2; see: S. M. Shuja, *Is the New World Order Emerging?*, "Contemporary Review," March 2004.

[33] See: J. Kaczmarek, *Terroryzm i konflikty zbrojne a fundamentalizm islamski*, Wrocław 2001, p. 131.

[34] Cf. I. Eland, *Evidence that the U.S. May Be Losing the Global War on Terror,* The Independent Institute, April 25 2005.

to claim that "terrorism should never be accepted, but it should always be expected."[35] Therefore, it is imperative to modify the counter-terrorism strategy so as to maximize the effects over the shortest time possible with little prejudice to local as well as global security. N. Ferguson rightly argues that the USA cannot handle the terrorist threat on its own due to the shrinking resources of its superpower-like strength. Ferguson analyzes the resources on three levels: economic strength, human resource potential (size of the military force), perception and engagement capabilities with reference to conflict situations.[36] The setback has had two implications for the U.S. security policy. On the one hand, the Americans have had to revise their anti-terror strategy by relinquishing unilateralism and seeking support with their allies. On the other hand, faced with dwidling resources, the USA has been losing the capability of operating domestically and overseas on a long-term basis, which necessitates the marginalization of terrorism resulting from a proper international relations set-up. It is certainly feasible once the potential disagreements and international tensions are resolved by means of diplomacy rather than by force. Furthermore, it is also essential to establish economic relations between the rich North and the poor South based on the principles of egalitarianism facilitating the speedy and sustainable development of Third World countries.[37] The next few years must, therefore, see the chaos of today transform into the new world order whose outline has been emerging from the debates held at many international forums (the UN, G-8, OECD).[38] Now the Western countries face the challenge of bringing these projects into effect.

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[35] See: J. Kaczmarek, op. cit., p. 218.

[36] Cf. N. Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 290–295; J. S. Nye, *Limits of American Power*, "Political Science Quarterly," vol. 117, no. 4, Winter 2002–2003, pp. 545–559.

[37] See among others: J. L. Windsor, *Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism*, "The Washington Quarterly," vol. 26, no. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 46–47.

[38] Cf. R. Satloff, *How to Win the Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #919: Special Forum Report.